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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF ALARM SYSTEM ERRORS ON DEPENDENCE: MODERATED
MEDIATION OF TRUST WITH AND WITHOUT RISK
Eric T. Chancey
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. James P. Bliss

Research on sensor-based signaling systems suggests that false alarms and misses affect
operator dependence via two independent psychological processes, hypothesized as two types of
trust. These two types of trust manifest in two categorically different behaviors: compliance and
reliance. The current study links the theoretical perspective outlined by Lee and See (2004) to the
compliance-reliance paradigm, and argues that trust mediates the false alarm-compliance
relationship but not the miss-reliance relationship. Specifically, the key conditions to allow the
mediation of trust are: The operator is presented with a salient choice to depend on the signaling
system and the risk associated with non-dependence is recognized. Eighty-eight participants
interacted with a primary flight simulation task and a secondary signaling system task.
Participants were asked to evaluate their trust in the signaling system according to the
informational bases of trust: Performance, process, and purpose. Half of the participants were in
a high risk group and half were in a low risk group. The signaling systems varied by reliability
(90%, 60%) within subjects and error bias (false alarm prone, miss prone) between subjects.
Generally, analyses supported the hypotheses. Reliability affected compliance, but only in the
false alarm prone group. Alternatively, reliability affected reliance, but only in the miss prone
group. Higher reliability led to higher subjective trust. Conditional indirect effects indicated that
individual factors of trust mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and compliance
(i.e., purpose) and reliance (i.e., process), but only in the high risk groups. Serial mediation

analyses indicated that the false alarm rate affected compliance and reliance through the
sequential ordering of the factors of trust, all stemming from performance. Miss rate did not
affect reliance through any of the factors of trust. The theoretical implications of this study
suggest the compliance-reliance paradigm is not the reflection of two independent types of trust.
The practical applications of this research could be to update training and design
recommendations that are based upon the assumption of trust causing operator responses
regardless of error bias.
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INTRODUCTION
As technological capability and sophistication have advanced, “can that function be
automated?” has been replaced with “should that function be automated?” Clearly, the
complexity and ubiquity of automation have grown in recent decades. In operational
environments, this shift has relegated the human to a monitor of automated systems. To help the
human manage numerous complex systems, sensor-based systems that issue signals have also
flourished.
Because signaling systems are not always reliable, humans do not always depend upon
associated signals. One of the key factors that guides the human’s dependence upon signaling
systems is operator trust (Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995; Lee & See, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Rice,
2009). Research suggests that the type of error generated by the signaling system (i.e., false
alarm or miss) leads to unique and independent types of trust. These two types of trust induce
two categorically different reactions from the human: compliance and reliance (Meyer, 2001).
Yet, researchers have not offered an adequate explanation about how each trust mediates the
relationship between signaling system errors and the dependence behaviors of compliance and
reliance. They have also not thoroughly explored the level of risk associated with evaluating
signaling system output.
The purpose of the current research is to provide a theoretical review of humanautomation trust, and relate it to the concepts of signaling system compliance and reliance. The
concepts and relationships reviewed will then be empirically tested. The review begins with a
framework and brief overview of automation to help the reader interpret the outcomes and
conclusions appropriately. Subsequent material will include theoretical and practical
applications.
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Automation
Automation has become pervasive, significantly altering human activities. It may reduce
human errors and workload, enhance efficiency, and provide economic advantages (Nickerson,
1999; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Thus, increased automation has flourished in many domains
(e.g., aviation, medicine, military, manufacturing, transportation, households, entertainment).
No matter the function, automated system performance cannot be well predicted by the
functionality of the technology alone. Research has shown that automation interacts with human
performance in often unexpected or unintended ways (Lee, 2006; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997;
Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Automation, therefore, is frequently judged by
gauging human performance. The term human-centered automation captures the essence of this
perspective, where automation is designed to complement the human operator in achieving a
common goal (Billings, 1996, p. 3; cf. Jordan, 1963). The extent to which a function is
automated is referred to as the level of automation (LOA). The LOA can range from fully
manual (Level 1) to fully automated (Level 10) (see Table 1). Although Table 1 provides a
reasonable description of LOAs according to the output functions of an automated system, it
does not account for “input” functions that precede decision making and actions (i.e.,
information-based automation; see Endsley & Kaber, 1999, and Sheridan & Verplank, 1978, for
similar frameworks of LOAs).
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Table 1
Levels of automation of decision and action selection.

HIGH

LOW

10. The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human.
9. informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to
8. informs the human only if asked, or
7. executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and
6. allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or
5. executes the suggestion if the human approves, or
4. suggests one alternative
3. narrows the selection down to a few, or
2. The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
1. The computer offers no assistance: human must take all decisions and
actions.

Note. Adapted from “A Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation” by
R. Parasuraman, T. B. Sheridan, and C. D. Wickens, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans, 30 (3), p. 287. Copyright 2000 by IEEE.

Parasuraman et al. (2000) suggested that it is possible to modify Table 1 to suit
information-based automation, yet did not propose a specific list of steps toward that end.
Reflecting a similar perspective, Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman, and McGee (1998, pp. 15-16, p.
243) proposed that information-based LOAs can reflect how six automated functions are
implemented: Filtering information, Information distribution, Information transformation,
Confidence expression, Integration checks, and Flexible user-specified information presentation.
Degree of feature implementation determines the LOA for information-based automation (e.g.,
filtering data would represent a lower LOA than if the automation suppresses data it determines
are irrelevant).
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Parasuraman et al.’s (2000) definition suggests automation replaces, partially or fully,
functions previously carried out by a human. On this point, Parasuraman et al. (2000) proposed a
framework that encompasses LOA’s underlying inputs (i.e., information-based automation) and
outputs (i.e., decision selection and action implementation automation). These automated
functions are mapped to a simplified version of corresponding stages of human information
processing (Figure 1; see Sheridan, 2000, for a similar framework).

Figure 1. Simplified model of human information processing system based on Parasuraman et al.
(2000). Note: System functions automated by processing stage are in parentheses.

Stage 1, sensory processing, corresponds to information acquisition automation, which
augments or replaces aspects of human selective attention and sensors (e.g., eyes, ears, skin), by
selecting, registering, and filtering input data (Parasuraman et al., 2000; Wickens, Lee, Liu, &
Becker, 2004; Wickens et al., 1998, p. 14). Stage 2, perception and working memory,
corresponds to information analysis automation, which augments or replaces cognitive processes
used to integrate information, assess situations, and provide diagnoses. Stage 3, decision making,
corresponds to decision selection automation, which augments or replaces cognitive processes
associated with deciding among alternatives and selecting appropriate actions. Stage 3
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automation departs from information analysis by making assumptions about the costs and values
of the decision impact, in a probabilistic and uncertain environment (Parasuraman et al., 2000;
Wickens et al., 2004, p. 421). Stage 4, response execution corresponds to control and action
execution automation. Generally, Stage 4 automation replaces human actions and manual control
(e.g., hand, foot, voice), to some degree (Parasuraman et al., 2000).
Although some forms of automation may represent a single stage, automation may
represent more than one stage. A system can incorporate some or all of the stages at various
LOAs. To illustrate, some physiological monitoring systems used in hospitals (e.g. automated
infusion pump) may alert healthcare workers to a patient’s abnormal physiological state (Stage
1), integrate those physiological symptoms and arrive at a diagnosis (Stage 2), recommend a
treatment (Stage 3), and then carry out that treatment (Stage 4) (Onnasch, Wickens, Li, &
Manzey, 2014).
Automation is often adopted because of an anticipated cost/benefit tradeoff. Designers
and management may also be reluctant to trust the human operator to accomplish a function that
could be carried out by a machine, resulting in a high LOA (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Sometimes, automation may be implemented simply to showcase technological skill (Nickerson,
1999). In many cases, the preference to automate where possible and economically beneficial
continues to be a common strategy (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008; Sheridan & Parasuraman,
2005). This strategy, however, often distances the human operator from the system and requires
continuous monitoring (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Unfortunately, it
is well documented that humans are poor monitors (Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008).
Human factors literature is replete with examples where operators failed to detect
automation breakdowns and intervene (Lee, 2006). Causes include lack of feedback from passive
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monitoring (Lee, 2006), vigilance (Warm et al., 2008), poor situation awareness (Endsley &
Kiris, 1995), and complacency (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). To
assist the human with monitoring complex or numerous automated systems, alerted-monitor
systems are often implemented to provide information about system trends, impending
breakdowns, and failures (Sorkin & Woods, 1985). This type of system is the focus of the
current work.
Alerted-Monitor Systems
The relationship between sensor-based signaling systems and human monitors has been
studied in both lab (e.g., Bliss, 2003; Breznitz, 1984) and field settings (e.g., Wickens et al.,
2009), within a multitude of domains and applications, e.g., security monitoring (Bliss &
Chancey, 2014), aviation (Pritchett, Vándor, & Edwards, 2002), hospitals (Xiao, Seagull,
Nieves-Khouw, Barczak, & Perkins, 2004), dismounted Soldier operations (Dzindolet, Pierce,
Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001), ground transportation (Lees & Lee, 2007), and power plants
(Carvalho, do Santos, Gomes, Borges, & Guerlain, 2008). The simplest paradigm used to
investigate the alerted-monitor system includes two subsystems: the sensor-based signaling
system and the task-engaged human monitor (Bliss & Gilson, 1998; Sorkin & Woods, 1985).
The following section describes the prototypical sensor-based signaling system. Signaling
system reliability and error bias are also reviewed, as these error characteristics impact the
attitudes (e.g., trust) and response behaviors of the human monitor differentially. Moreover, this
review will inform the design of the experimental tasks and signaling system in the current work.
Sensor-Based Signaling Systems. The sensor-based signaling system represents a broad
category of automation that employs stimuli such as alarms, alerts, and warnings (Bliss &
Gilson, 1998). Signaling systems are designed to direct the attention of the user to hazards that
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may require intervention or further inspection (Meyer, 2004). It is not difficult to identify or
envision a signaling system that could be classified as Stage 3 automation (e.g., traffic alert and
collision avoidance system directing a pilot to “pull up”) or Stage 4 automation (e.g., automatic
ground collision avoidance systems that warn of an impending collision and take control of the
aircraft; Swihart, 2009). Yet, the prototypical signaling system, at a minimum, is generally an
information-based automation that augments Stages 1 (i.e., directs attention) and 2 (i.e.,
diagnoses a critical event).
Signals generated by these systems do not all require the same reaction from the human
monitor, particularly with regard to timeliness. Indeed, the military standard for aircraft alerting
systems differentiates between warnings, cautions, and advisories (MIL-STD-411F, 10 March
1997). Warnings indicate the existence of a hazardous condition, which requires immediate
action to prevent negative consequence (e.g., loss of life, equipment damage). Cautions indicate
the existence of a condition that does not require immediate action. Advisories indicate a safe or
normal operating condition, which attracts attention to impart information for routine
performance. It should also be noted that, based on military standards, the term warning can be
used interchangeably with alarm and the term alert can be used interchangeably with caution
(MIL-STD-1472G 11 January 2012; MIL-HDBK-1908B 16 August 1999).
Signaling systems have sometimes been referred to as signal detection systems, which
describe devices that are compatible with signal detection theory (SDT) and analysis (Sorkin &
Woods, 1985). From this perspective, the signaling system monitors and analyzes noisy input
data for abnormal conditions, or signal events. The purpose of the signaling system is to
discriminate between signal-plus-noise events (abnormal conditions) and noise-alone events
(normal conditions; Sorkin & Woods, 1985, pp. 52-53). Signal detection theory assumes four
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potential decision outcomes, a hit (signal present and signaling system responds signal present),
a correct rejection (signal absent and signaling system responds signal absent), a miss (signal
present and signaling system responds signal absent), and a false alarm (signal absent and
signaling system responds signal present). Detection of the signal, within the SDT paradigm, is
described by two parameters: sensitivity and response criterion.
The sensitivity parameter describes the effectiveness with which the signaling system is
capable of distinguishing between abnormal and normal conditions (i.e., d'; Sorkin & Woods,
1985). Designers should attempt to maximize system sensitivity. This parameter, however, is
restricted by technological capability and the knowledge required to inform what constitutes an
abnormal condition (Sorkin & Woods, 1985; e.g., knowledge required to design algorithms that
detect cardiac arrhythmia, Drew, et al., 2004).
The sensor threshold setting is represented by the signaling system’s response criterion
(i.e., β or c), or the degree of evidence required to issue a signal event. In the event that the
signaling system makes an error, this parameter determines the type of error it is more likely to
make (i.e., error bias). Although signaling system algorithms can be complex, the output can be
conceptualized as conditional logic based on a preset threshold. For example, in the case of a
household smoke detector, if the environmental concentration of smoke exceeds a preset
threshold (e.g., black smoke exceeds 10% optical density per foot; Geiman & Gottuk, 2003),
then the signaling system issues an alarm (if not then the signaling system remains silent).
Unlike the sensitivity parameter, the threshold setting is not limited by technological
capability. Instead, this parameter can be set to any level desired (Sorkin & Woods, 1985).
Importantly, if the sensor threshold is set too conservatively (i.e., much evidence is required to
issue a signal present), then false alarms will be minimized at the expense of abnormal
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conditions not being signaled. Alternatively, if the sensor threshold is set too liberally (i.e.,
minimal evidence is required to issue a signal present), then the chance of signaling an abnormal
event will be maximized, at the expense of frequent false alarms.
Commonly, sensor thresholds are set to minimize the chance of missing an abnormal
event (Sorkin & Woods, 1985). One reason for adopting this setting, and indeed one of the
reasons for adopting signaling systems generally, is legalistic policies associated with
manufactures’ “obligation to warn” (Bliss & Gilson, 1998). Moreover, the costs associated with
a signaling system missing an event often have the potential to be disastrous. To this point,
during a series of recent penetration tests conducted by the Department of Homeland Security,
undercover investigators were able to smuggle mock explosives and banned weapons through
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoints in multiple United States airports.
Airport screeners missed detecting dangerous items in 67 out of 70 tests (Fishel, Thomas,
Levine, & Date, 2015). In a statement to Congress, the Inspector General of Homeland Security
indicated that these misses were due to a combination of both human and technology-based
failures. In a summary of one of these tests, Homeland Security investigators identified
technological vulnerabilities associated with explosive detection systems and explosives trace
detection equipment. The summary indicated that the TSA does not have a process in place to
assess or identify equipment failures or the capability to assess whether explosive detection
systems are operating at the correct detection standards (Department of Homeland Security:
Office of the Inspector General, 2014).
Yet overly liberal threshold settings, which generate frequent false alarms, can also have
severe consequences. For example, hospitals employ a multitude of physiological monitoring
systems that signal changes in critical life functions (e.g., cardiac patterns, blood oxygenation).
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Because of the criticality of these monitored functions, alarm thresholds are often purposefully
set to be extremely liberal (Drew, et al., 2004). This liberal setting, however, produces many
false alarms (Welch, 2011). Excessive false alarms have led to instances of clinical alarm
fatigue, where healthcare workers have anticipated a false alarm and failed to respond to a
serious condition in a timely manner or at all (Keller, 2012). Unfortunately, when alarms are
true, delayed or absent responses can result in patient death or injury (Solet & Barach, 2012). To
combat the excessive false alarms associated with these devices, some hospitals (e.g., Boston
Medical Center) have recently opted to adjust default manufacturer threshold settings to be more
conservative, in accordance with clinically significant changes in physiological parameters
(Whalen et al., 2014).
Sensitivity and response criterion both determine system reliability, which can
significantly impact the human monitor’s responses and attitudes such as trust (Chancey, Bliss,
Proaps, & Madhavan, 2015a). Sullivan, Tsimhoni, and Bogard (2008) describe three of the
dominant perspectives on signaling system reliability. From an engineering perspective,
reliability is defined by the extent to which the signaling system consistently produces the same
results under the same conditions (i.e., a signaling system is reliable if it consistently activates
during abnormal events). From a functional perspective, reliability is defined by the number of
errors (false alarms and misses) that occur during a given time period. Finally, reliability can be
defined by the subjective proportion of false alarms per total alarms during a given time period,
which is considered the user perspective. This is the user’s perspective because missed events
are simply overlooked if not regularly detected. Reviewing the effects of signaling system
reliability on performance, Wickens and Dixon (2007) opted for a functional definition of
reliability, because this perspective allows for a simple calculation of proportion or percentage of
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correct diagnoses and is a scale typically used in reliability engineering. Therefore, to simplify
the alerted-monitor paradigm and allow for easier translation, the current work will adopt the
functional reliability perspective.
Human Monitor. Considering the signaling system in isolation will not fully reflect
alerted-monitor performance. Instead, the error characteristics of the signaling system often
affect the decision-making and action implementation processes of the human monitor. The
previous section highlighted two signaling system parameters: reliability and error bias. This
section describes each of these parameters in terms of their impact on human reactions.
Signaling System Reliability on Human Reactions. In theory, most of the design and
training recommendations for signaling systems are based on the assumption that when presented
with a signal, the human will acknowledge the authenticity of it and react appropriately (Bliss &
Gilson, 1998). Yet this is not always the case, particularly when a system is unreliable.
Generally, higher reliability leads to higher response rates toward signals (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995;
Chancey et al., 2015a; Manzey, Gerard, & Wiczorek, 2014), quicker signal reaction times (e.g.,
Chancey et al., 2015a; Getty, Swets, Pickett, & Gonthier, 1995), and greater operator sensitivity
(e.g., Chancey et al., 2015a; Rice, 2009).
Wickens and Dixon (2007) published a literature review investigating the effects of
signaling system reliability on human performance, specifically reaction time and accuracy.
Their results indicated that higher reliability generally led to better performance. The authors
reported a “cross-over point” of 70% reliability, below which the human is better off without the
aid of a signaling system at all.
Proposing a 70% cutoff implies that systems with reliability levels below this point
represent a waste of resources, as they offer no additional value and may impede performance.
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Of note, however, the studies included in Wickens and Dixon’s review targeted laboratory-based
studies with reliability rates above 50%. To illustrate the reliabilities of real world systems,
hospital alarms have reported reliability levels of 27% (Chambrin et al., 1999), 5% (Lawless,
1994), and even less than 1% (Tsien & Fackler, 1997). Yet, these systems are often described as
“essential to providing safe care to patients” (The Joint Commission, 2013). Bliss and Chancey
(2013) reported a study in which participants interacted with a 20% and 40% reliable signaling
system. Their results indicated that although participants responded to more alarms in the 40%
condition, their accuracy was slightly better in the 20% condition.
Some researchers have noted that, under certain circumstances, the human’s response rate
tends to match the expected probability of true signals, a response pattern termed probability
matching (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Manzey et al., 2014; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). The
notion of trust calibration, which refers to the degree to which the automation is trusted versus
how much it should be trusted, has been used to describe the process that determines probability
matching responses. Bliss et al. (1995) were the first to report this type of response pattern
toward unreliable signaling systems, where 90% of the participants in this study tended to match
their response rate to the reliability of the system (e.g., in the 75% group, participants responded
to approximately 75% of the alarms).
Wiegmann et al. (2001) mathematically illustrated how probability matching affects
overall alerted-monitor system performance. If a system is 80% reliable and the operator
probability matches, then across 100 signals and responses, the alerted-monitor system would
arrive at 64 correct diagnoses (i.e., 0.8 × 80 = 64). The remaining 20 of the human’s responses
would be opposite of the signal system responses, arriving at four correct diagnoses (i.e., 0.2 ×
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20 = 4). This results in an overall accuracy rate of 68% (i.e., 64 + 4 = 68) for the alerted-monitor
system (Wiegmann et al., 2001).
Yet, Bliss et al. (1995) noted a minority of participants (10%) optimized their strategy by
responding to every signal, termed an extreme response pattern. This is an optimal strategy
because if the participant responds to every signal for an 80% reliable system across 100 signals,
the alerted-monitor system would be correct 80 times (i.e., 0.8 × 100 = 80 correct; Wiegmann et
al., 2001). To clarify when a responder is more likely to adopt an extreme response pattern, Bliss
(2003) conducted a retrospective analysis across seven of his own studies. He noted that when
the system was transparent (i.e., alarm validity information could be used to crosscheck the
output of the signaling system), most participants probability matched. Alternatively, when the
system was opaque (i.e., no alarm validity information was presented), a greater percentage of
participants adopted an extreme response pattern (see also Manzey et al., 2014).
Across the studies reported by Bliss (2003), participants were always informed of the
reliability of the signaling system prior to interacting with it. Wang, Jamieson, and Hollands
(2009) tested the effects of reliability disclosure on a metric of signaling system reliance (i.e.,
response bias difference). Wang et al. reported that participants with reliability information more
appropriately varied their reliance upon the aid, in accordance with the reliability level, than
those who were not provided with reliability information. Indeed, providing reliability
information can greatly affect response rate, irrespective of the true reliability of the system.
Bliss, Dunn, and Fuller (1995) reported a study in which participants interacted with a 50%
reliable signaling system across two sessions. Before beginning the second session an
experimental confederate falsely informed participants that the signaling system was 75%
reliable, which resulted in an increased response rate during the subsequent session (see Chancey
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& Bliss, 2012, for a similar effect of information reliability disclosure on responses in a
navigation task).
Signaling System Error Bias on Human Reactions. Although signaling system reliability
clearly affects the reaction strategy of the human monitor, the type of error (i.e., false alarm or
miss) also affects reactions. Excessive false alarms often lead to instances in which the operator
reduces, slows, or stops their responses (Breznitz, 1984; Getty et al., 1995; Sorkin, 1988). These
types of reactions have been often referred to as examples of the cry-wolf effect.
Alternatively, if the signaling system has been shown to miss critical events, then the user
may be forced to monitor the raw data to ensure that events are not overlooked (Chancey et al.,
2015a). This creates a situation in which the operator is forced to divide attention among tasks,
leading to increased workload and deterioration in performance indices (Dixon & Wickens,
2006; Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007). Such protective data monitoring is termed defensive
monitoring (Adams, Bruyn, Houde, & Angelopoulos, 2003). In some cases, defensive
monitoring behavior may be excessive; the operator is then said to be a skeptical monitor (Moray
& Inagaki, 1999). Alternatively, in situations featuring extremely reliable but miss-prone
systems, operators may demonstrate complacency by under-sampling the raw data (Dixon &
Wickens, 2006; Moray & Inagaki, 1999). Bailey and Scerbo (2007) reported two experiments
where increasing the reliability of highly reliable automated systems led to a decrease in
monitoring performance.
Human monitor reactions clearly depend upon both the reliability (error rate) and error
bias (type of error) of the signaling system. One of the most prominent theoretical constructs
thought to mediate the causal connection between the error characteristics of the signaling
system and human reactions, is the level of trust the human has in the automation. Because of its
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role in the proposed study, the remainder of this review will elaborate upon the psychological
effects of trust as it relates to human-automation interaction and, more specifically, the alertedmonitor system.
Trust in Automation
The notion that trust in automation influences operator reactions is not new. Sheridan
hypothesized the concept of operator trust in supervisory control paradigms frequently over the
years (e.g., Sheridan & Verplank, 1978; Sheridan, Fischhoff, Posner, & Pew, 1983; Sheridan &
Hennessy, 1984). However, Muir (1987, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996) is largely credited with the
first formal attempt to model trust in automation. She proposed a two-dimensional framework to
study human-machine relationships, which were based on existing taxonomies of interpersonal
trust (i.e., Barber, 1983; Remple, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) and has led to a multitude of
theoretical perspectives that vary in terms of how trust in automation is conceptualized (see
Table 2).
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Table 2
Selected Human-Automation Trust Theories Arranged Chronologically.

Human-Automation
Trust Theory
References

Description

Muir (1987, 1994;
Muir & Moray,
1996)

Proposed a framework that integrated bases of trust (persistence,
technical competence, and responsibility) and dynamics of trust
(predictability, dependability, and faith).

Lee and Moray
(1992; 1994)

Proposed modified version of Muir’s framework, which added
leap of faith, understanding, and trial-and-error experience
(Zuboff, 1988). Related this updated framework to the concepts of
purpose, process, and performance.

Parasuraman and
Riley (1997; Riley,
1996)

Cited trust as one of the key components in determining
automation use, along with other variables such as workload,
perceived risk, and self-confidence.

Cohen,
Parasuraman, and
Freeman (1998)

Proposed the Argument-based Probabilistic Trust (APT) model,
which introduced the use of event-trees that probabilistically
model decisions to determine automation dependence.

Seong and Bisantz
(1999; Seong,
Bisantz, & Gattie,
2006)
Dzindolet et al.
(2001)

Proposed a trust model based on Brunswik’s (1952) Lens model,
which attempted to account for trust calibration.

Lee and See (2004)

Proposed a qualitative model that specified how to design trustable
automation and presented a review of both interpersonal and
human-automation trust theories.

Madhavan and
Wiegmann (2007)

Proposed a model of sequential development of trust for
automation and humans and, additionally, a framework of factors
that affect the development of trust in automation.

Hoff and Bashir
(2015)

Proposed a three-layer trust model consisting of dispositional,
situational, and learned trust.

Proposed a conceptual model of automation use, which cited trust
as a key component. Loosely based on concepts proposed by
Parasuraman and Riley (1997).
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Although each perspective has added to the understanding of human-automation trust,
some theoretical perspectives are limited in scope and application or do not align with the ideas
presented in this work. To illustrate, some models advocate behavioral measurement of trust
(e.g., Seong & Bisantz, 1999) or appear indifferent to inferences of trust from behavior (e.g.,
Dzindolet et al., 2001). Additionally, some models conceptualize trust as a relatively rational
thought process (e.g., Cohen et al., 1998) or omit key related concepts associated with trust, such
as perceived risk or vulnerability (e.g., Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007).
The work of Lee and See (2004), however, provides arguably the most comprehensive
and integrative perspective on the topic of trust in automation, which is largely based on the
work of Muir (1987; 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996) and Lee and Moray (1992; 1994). The
framework of Lee and See explains how behavioral reactions, such as compliance and reliance,
are related but different from attitudes such as trust. Moreover, this framework also points to key
trust-related concepts often overlooked in experimental designs used in the study of signal
reaction behaviors, such as the perceived risk associated with compliance or reliance. Therefore,
although the current work acknowledges aspects of existing human-automation and interpersonal
trust theories, it will generally adopt the theoretical structure and terminology proposed by Lee
and See’s (2004) conceptualization of trust in automation.
Lee and See (2004) noted that trust has been conceptualized in very different ways across
researchers. Some theorize trust as a belief (e.g., Kramer, 1999), an attitude (e.g., Barber, 1983),
an intention (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, 2007), or as a behavior (e.g., Deutsch,
1960; Meyer, 2001). To resolve these conflicting perspectives, Lee and See (2004) utilized the
framework developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977, 1980). This framework depicts beliefs as the
informational basis for attitudes. Beliefs are influenced by experience and the availability of
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information. Attitudes are affective evaluations of beliefs that lead to the formation of intentions.
Intentions then lead to behaviors, which are regulated by environmental and cognitive variables.
Lee and See (2004) noted that trust is best conceptualized as an attitude, where beliefs about the
characteristics of the automation help form the basis for adopting a particular level of trust.
Depending on the level of trust, this may lead a person to adopt an intention that leads to a
behavior. Lee and See (2004) suggested that considering trust as a behavior or intention has the
potential to confound its effects with other variables that likely affect behavior (e.g., workload,
situation awareness, self-confidence). From this perspective, there is a clear distinction between
trust as an attitude and behavioral reactions, such as signaling system compliance and reliance.
Lee and See (2004) go on to highlight two important components associated with trust.
First, one common theme among most conceptualizations of trust is the notion of vulnerability,
where the trustor willingly assumes risk by delegating responsibility to the trustee (cf. Mayer et
al., 1995). This responsibility implies that the trustee is advancing the goal of the trustor, which
leads to the second component: goal orientation. Although most perspectives of trust do not
explicitly include this component, most highlight the importance of allowing a trustee to perform
a particular action on behalf of the trustor (i.e., to help advance the trustor’s goals; cf. Mayer et
al., 1995). Reflecting these perspectives, Lee and See (2004) define trust as “an attitude that an
agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and
vulnerability.”
From this definition, Lee and See (2004) described trust in terms of appropriateness,
where trust is compared to the capabilities of the automation. Trust appropriateness describes the
relationships between the error characteristics of the system and the resulting behavioral
reactions. Reaction behaviors can result in either an over dependence or an under dependence

19

upon the automation, described as misuse and disuse respectively (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Trust appropriateness is broken down to calibration, resolution, and specificity.
Calibration denotes how close the match is between a human’s trust and the automation’s
capabilities (e.g., reliability level, error bias). Calibration has been used to describe reaction
strategies such as probability matching (e.g., Wiegmann et al., 2001) and monitoring behaviors
such as complacency (e.g., Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Moray & Inagaki, 1999). Operators
demonstrate poor trust calibration by over trusting the system (i.e., trusting it above its
capabilities, generating misuse), or under trusting the system (i.e., trusting the system below its
capabilities, generating disuse) (cf. Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2008).
Resolution indicates the sensitivity of automation trust to differentiate among automation
capability levels. To illustrate, an operator who trusts a 60% reliable system the same as a 90%
reliable system illustrates poor resolution. Presumably, if the operator trusts the 60% and 90%
reliable system equally, trust should not cause the operator’s response rate to be markedly
different between these two systems. An operator who trusts a 90% reliable system slightly more
than an 89% reliable system, however, illustrates good resolution and should demonstrate
behavior that approximates the reliability levels accordingly (i.e., probability matching).
Specificity denotes the level of trust associated with a particular function at a particular
time and situation, which is similar to the concept of system-wide trust (Keller & Rice 2009;
Rice & Geels, 2010). Keller and Rice (2009) showed that participants’ reactions to an individual
perfectly reliable aid depended upon the presence of unrelated unreliable aids. The authors
concluded that participants based their reactions on “system-wide trust” rather than trust in a
specific component.
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Lee and See (2004) described trust as an affective evaluation of the characteristics of the
trustee. Moreover, that evaluation helps determine if the trustee can achieve the goals of the
trustor. This premise implies two components that form the basis of trust: the focus (i.e., what is
to be trusted) and the type of goal-oriented information supporting the trust.
The focus of trust is described according to the degree of detail (e.g., trust in an
organization versus an individual). This concept is often related to general versus specific trust,
which corresponds to trust specificity outlined above. From this perspective, trust might
correspond to beliefs about the overall system of automations or beliefs about a particular mode
of an automated aid (Lee & See, 2004; p. 58).
Researchers often describe goal-oriented information that supports trust in terms of
attributional abstraction. From this perspective, trust is initially based on observable behaviors
and progresses to being based on more abstract concepts in reference to the trustee. Based on
relationships among close partnerships (i.e., couples), Rempel et al. (1985) theorized that
interpersonal trust is initially based on direct “coding” of partner behaviors and then, once trust
becomes more established, trust is based more on the trustor’s belief about the trustee’s
motivations (p. 98). Rempel et al. (1985) denote this evolution of trust as progressing from
predictability, which is influenced by the predictability of a partner’s behaviors, to dependability,
which is influenced by the perception of the characteristics of the trustee, to faith, which is not
“securely rooted” in past behaviors, but is instead based on a belief that the trustee can be
depended upon irrespective of the available evidence. Another well cited article among
organizational psychology is that of Mayer et al. (1995), which proposed similar bases of trust,
describing ability, integrity, and benevolence (each corresponding to predictability,
dependability, and faith, respectively).
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Based on Rempel et al. (1985), and originally proposed by Lee and Moray (1992), Lee
and See (2004) proposed similar bases for trust in automation: performance, process, and
purpose. Performance describes what the automation does, and corresponds to the current and
historical operation of the automation to include reliability, predictability, and ability. This
closely resembles the concept of predictability, where trust is based on observable behavior or
performance. For this component, automation that readily achieves the operator’s goals will lead
to greater trust. Process describes how the automation operates, and corresponds to the
appropriateness of the automation’s algorithms in achieving the operator’s goals. This closely
resembles the concept of dependability, where the focus shifts from observable behaviors of the
automation to the characteristics attributed to the automation. For this component, automation
that appears capable of achieving the operator’s goals and is understandable will lead to greater
trust. Finally, purpose describes why the automation was developed, and corresponds to how
well the designer’s intent has been communicated to the operator. This closely resembles the
concept of faith, where trust is based on the belief that the automation can be depended upon in
the absence of observing past behaviors. For this component, automation that achieves the goals
it was designed to achieve (i.e., the operator’s goals) will lead to greater trust.
In contrast to interpersonal theories (e.g., Mayer, et al., 1995; Rempel et al., 1985), where
trust is hypothesized to evolve sequentially through stages of attributional abstraction (i.e.,
performance then process then purpose), Lee and See (2004) conceptualized trust as being based
on different levels of attribution that do not necessarily follow a pre-defined sequence. Early in
the human-automation relationship the operator may not have had the opportunity to observe the
automation’s behaviors (i.e., performance), yet may have a clear understanding of the purpose of
the automation. From this perspective, trust may initially be faith-based or based on purpose,
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rather than on the coding of observed behavioral performance. It should be noted, however, that
although faith-based trust, or purpose, is similar to dispositional trust, it differs in important
ways. Whereas dispositional trust is conceptualized as an enduring personality trait (e.g., Rotter,
1967), the attitude of trust is dynamic and evolves as the relationship between a trustee and
trustor develops (e.g., from being based on purpose to being based on process; Lee & See, 2004).
Additionally, the attitude of trust is “history-dependent” and depends upon information or
behavior about a trustee, whereas dispositional trust is determined by generalized past similar
experiences (Lee & See, 2004; cf. Bliss, 2009).
Lee and See (2004) proposed that although trust is largely influenced by affective
processes, analytical and analogical processes can also determine the assimilation of goal
oriented information. From an analytical perspective, trust reflects accumulated knowledge from
previous interactions with the trustee. These interactions are used to rationally and
probabilistically determine the behavior of the trustee (cf. APT model by Cohen et al., 1998). To
illustrate, when given the opportunity to take one exit verses another, a driver may create a
rational argument to analyze the expected outcome or probability of reaching their destination
quickly when using the directions provided by a Global Positioning Device (GPS) verses a
passenger (e.g., GPS provided correct directions 24/33 times during previous trips, weighted
against the passenger being correct 7/12 times during previous trips). Lee and See (2004) argued,
however, that this perspective overemphasizes the cognitive capability of the human decision
maker to effectively engage in conscious calculations or to make exhaustive comparisons among
alternatives (p. 62). Analytical processes, therefore, are likely complemented by other processes
such as analogical judgments that rely on category membership. From this perspective, trust
develops through direct observations, intermediaries who convey their own observations, and
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assumptions based on existing standards, category memberships, and procedures (p. 62). For
example, the driver may have read in the user manual that the GPS is less reliable in bad
weather, so he or she decides not to comply with the directive because it is raining (cf. hearsay
technique used by Bliss et al., 1995). This process is similar to the concept of rule-based
behaviors (Rasmussen, 1983), where behavior is determined by condition-action pairings.
Yet, Lee and See (2004) proposed that affective processes largely influence the effect of
trust on behavior, because trust is not only thought about but also felt (Fine & Holyfield, 1996, p.
25). When expectations about the trustee’s performance do not conform to predictions, trust may
be betrayed and emotions signal the need to change the behavior of the operator. With
automation becoming increasingly sophisticated, operators often lack the cognitive resources to
rationally predict its behavior. Lee and See (2004) suggest, therefore, that emotions guide
behaviors when rules do not apply or when cognitive resources are not available to make a
rational choice.
Based on the theoretical perspective outlined by Lee and See (2004), the behaviors
observed in reaction to the error characteristics of the signaling systems could plausibly be
mediated by trust. Indeed, Lee and See (2004) note that trust’s effect on automation dependence
is part of a closed-loop process. If the system is not trusted, then the human will not depend upon
it; this results in the operator having limited information regarding its capabilities. This further
limits trust growth.
Lee and See (2004) suggested, however, that mediation by trust greatly depends upon the
type and presentation of automation. Specifically, with information acquisition automation (e.g.,
sensor-based signaling systems), Lee and See suggested it is possible for the operator to observe
the behavior of the system even if they are not depending upon it (yet, this is true only if the
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system is transparent). On this point, Lee and See (2004) made an important distinction between
system states that require the operator to react in response to a signal and those that require
acknowledgement of normal operating conditions (e.g., signaling system is silent). This
distinction is captured by the concepts of compliance and reliance respectively.
Compliance, Reliance, and Trust
Importantly, the concepts of compliance and reliance reflect separate psychological
processes that motivate operator dependence in the alerted-monitor paradigm, proposed as “two
types of trust” (Meyer, 2001; Rice, 2009). Research suggests that these two independent types of
trust underlie two distinct behaviors toward unreliable signaling systems that produce either false
alarms or misses. Compliance refers to the human operator responding when the signaling
system issues a signal (e.g., in the event of a fire alarm, the human is compliant if he or she
leaves the building). Reliance, alternatively, refers to the human refraining from a response when
the signaling system is silent or indicates normal operating conditions (e.g., if a fire alarm is
silent, then the human is reliant if he or she does not leave a building because of a suspected
fire). Together, compliance and reliance are referred to as signaling system dependence, which
can imply either a response (such as compliance) or a non-response (such as reliance).
Importantly, however, in some instances reliance can also be a response to a signaling system
indicating normal operating conditions or a safe state (e.g., a TSA agent allowing an individual
through an airport screening gate when a security scanner does not detect banned substances or
items).
Generally, compliance and reliance are described as behaviors, or sometimes the a lack of
a behavior in the case of reliance (e.g., Dixon et al., 2007; Meyer, 2001, 2004; Rice, 2009; Rice
& McCarley, 2011; Manzey et al., 2014). Yet some researchers describe compliance and reliance
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as cognitive states (e.g., Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Wickens & McCarley, 2008). To illustrate this
perspective, Wickens and McCarley (2008) describe reliance as “…the cognitive state that
allows an operator to feel confident that there really is no hazard at the times when the alert is
silent” (p. 36). Alternatively, the authors refer to compliance as “…the cognitive state that allows
the operator to act confidently in response to an alarm when it occurs” (p. 36). Additionally,
Meyer, Wiczorek, and Günzler (2014) interchangeably refer to compliance and reliance as both
behaviors and psychological constructs (i.e., two types of trust, cf. Meyer, 2001).
This disagreement leads to a somewhat confusing conceptualization for what compliance
and reliance are (cognitive states, behaviors, or both). Although some researchers acknowledge
the distinction between psychological trust and dependence behaviors (e.g., Rice, 2009), others
appear to suggest compliance and reliance behaviors are themselves two types of trust (e.g.,
Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2014). Yet, regardless of the perspective taken, compliance and
reliance are generally always operationalized as behaviors: e.g., agreement or response rate (e.g.,
Bustamante, 2009; Chancey, Bliss, Liechty, & Proaps, 2015b; Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Manzey
et al., 2014; Rice, 2009; Rice & McCarley, 2011), response time (e.g., Dixon & Wickens, 2006;
Rice, 2009; Meyer et al., 2014), secondary-task performance (e.g., Dixon & Wickens, 2006;
Dixon et al., 2007), or response criterion (e.g., Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2014). Although there
is some discrepancy in the literature as to what compliance and reliance are, the current work
takes the perspective that compliance and reliance are behaviors and not cognitive states (or
simultaneously behaviors and cognitive states).
If compliance and reliance are behaviors, then it is a straightforward matter to
conceptualize two types of psychological trust that influence those behaviors. Meyer’s (2001;
2004) initial work implies two notions. First, compliance should be affected when the signaling
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system issues a signal present, and therefore more likely degraded by the error associated with an
issued signal (i.e., false alarm). If the signaling system is unreliable and false alarm prone (FP),
then it will likely lead to a manifestation of the cry-wolf effect via one type of trust. Second,
reliance should be affected when the signaling system indicates normal operating conditions, and
therefore more likely degraded by the error associated with a signal not being issued (i.e., miss).
If the signaling system is unreliable and miss prone (MP), then it will likely lead to defensive
monitoring via a second type of trust.
Rice (2009) suggested that an extreme version of Meyer’s (2001) original
conceptualization for the relationship between error bias and dependence takes the form of
Model B in Figure 2. In this model, trust in alerts mediates the relationship between false alarms
and compliance through a single process. Alternatively, trust in nonalerts mediates the
relationship between misses and reliance through a single process. From this perspective,
compliance and reliance are independent and there are two separate forms of trust.

27

Figure 2. Signaling system errors on dependence: (A) Single-process model, (B) selective twoprocess model, (C) Mandler’s two-process model, and (D) nonselective two-process model.
Adapted from “Examining single- and multiple-process theories of trust in automation,” by S.
Rice, The Journal of General Psychology, 13(3), p. 307. Copyright 2009 by Heldref
Publications. Models originally adapted from Dunn and Kisner (1988).

Dixon and Wickens (2006) reported a study where participants were aided by unreliable
signaling systems that were either FP or MP. As Dixon and Wickens hypothesized, the results
indicated that the FP system degraded compliance, whereas the MP system degraded reliance.
Moreover, the MP system did not affect compliance. Yet, the FP system affected both
compliance and, to a lesser degree, reliance. Based on these results, it is unclear whether false
alarms and misses affect compliance and reliance independently (i.e., Figure 2B) or false alarms
non-selectively affect both compliance and reliance (i.e., Figure 2C).
Confirming the non-selectivity of false alarms on both behavioral categories, Dixon et al.
(2007) reported that a FP system affected both compliance and reliance (i.e., Figure 2C). Rice
(2009) suggested that this type of non-selective effect of false alarms on compliance and reliance
implies that trust in alerts also affects reliance, whereas the trust in nonalerts only affects
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reliance. Dixon et al. (2007) suggested, however, that false alarms may have affected both
dependence behaviors because false alarms were accompanied by a more salient perceptual event
(i.e., auditory alert), and were simply more noticeable and memorable errors than misses (p.
571).
On this point, Rice and McCarley (2011) conducted an experiment in which signaling
system misses and false alarms were matched for perceptual salience. The results from this
experiment indicated that FP systems led to lower performance and dependence (compliance and
reliance) than MP systems of matched reliability. Meyer et al. (2014) also found that false alarms
affected compliance and reliance, whereas misses only affected reliance, when misses and false
alarms were matched for perceptual salience. Rice and McCarley (2011) suggested that, above
any perceptual saliency differences, false alarms might also be more cognitively salient than
misses (i.e., false alarms are weighted heavier in determining operator judgments than misses).
Indeed, a second experiment conducted by Rice and McCarley (2011) showed that when false
alarms were framed as neutral messages (i.e., the system indicated only target present, but not
target absent events), the false alarm and miss asymmetry was reduced.
Rice (2009), however, provided a somewhat different perspective regarding the
compliance-reliance distinction. Rice described a study (Rice & McCarley, 2008) in which
misses, in addition to false alarms, affected both compliance and reliance. Rice suggested that
these results could indicate one of two possibilities: there is a singular type of trust affecting both
dependence behaviors (Figure 2A) or there are two types of trust that non-selectively affect both
compliance and reliance (Figure 2D). Rice’s analysis indicated that there are two forms of trust
(i.e., Figure 2D). Specifically, false alarms have a strong effect on compliance and a weaker
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effect on reliance. Alternatively, misses have a strong effect on reliance and a weaker effect on
compliance.
The preceding review provides compelling evidence to suggest that false alarms and
misses affect compliance and reliance differentially, and that those relationships are likely
mediated by two seemingly different or even independent psychological processes.
Unfortunately, prior research has not specified the nature of those processes. A common theme
within alerted-monitor system research is that the roles of operator trust are assumed and inferred
from the behavior observed. Indeed, an alternative explanation might be that a singular trust is
formed in a qualitatively different way (or absent), depending upon the error bias of an unreliable
signaling system. This, however, is difficult to discern from the observations of dependence
behaviors alone. By assuming the role of trust as a singular explanation in determining the
behavior, researchers may be oversimplifying the alerted-monitor system and overlooking
important aspects associated with the human monitor subsystem.
Differentiating Trust from Compliance-Reliance Behaviors. There are several
perspectives from which to question the value of assuming the effects of trust based on the
observation of a behavior. One perspective is that there is a circular logic associated with
inferring trust from behaviors alone. A second perspective is that by operationalizing
psychological trust as a behavior, there is a plausible oversimplification of the process.
Justifying trust as the sole determinant of compliance or reliance is untenable because
these behaviors may be affected by other processes (e.g., workload, self-confidence, perceived
risk; Chancey et al., 2015b; Lee & Moray, 1994; Lee & See, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995, 2007;
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Interestingly, interpersonal trust research and human-automation
trust research share an offset but parallel historical evolution. Early studies concerning
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interpersonal trust frequently used a prisoner’s dilemma game and operationalized trust as
cooperative behavior between participants (e.g., Deutsch, 1960, 1958; Loomis, 1959; Solomon,
1960). Additionally, some researchers equated cooperative behavior with trust when defining the
construct, e.g., trust is “the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least
not detrimental to us is high enough to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him”
(Gambetta, 1988, p. 217).
Yet, this perspective led to a general critique among interpersonal trust researchers
concerning the oversimplification of the effect of trust on behavior. Key and Knox (1970)
questioned the value of studies that used the prisoner’s dilemma game and cooperation to
quantify trust. Key and Knox (1970) argued that it is possible to observe cooperative behavior
with the plausible absence of trust, where the behavior may be based on other motives or
rationales (e.g., in the absence of perceived risk and vulnerability).
Mayer et al. (1995) proposed that it is conceivable to cooperate with a person whom one
does not trust, particularly if there are external control mechanisms that punish the trustee for
deceitful behavior. Chancey, Proaps, and Bliss (2013) made a similar argument in the case of
trust in automation, where pilots may be procedurally mandated to comply with certain alarms
irrespective of their trust (although in this case, the control mechanism is placed upon the trustor
not the trustee). Wiegmann et al. (2001) noted two instances in which trust may plausibly
dissociate from behavior: the automation may be unreliable, but more accurate than the operator;
and the operator may not have the information required to inform a diagnosis (i.e., the system is
opaque). Rice (2009) proposed that an operator might not trust an automated aid but still depend
upon it, because he or she is overloaded and does not have the time to crosscheck the aid’s
accuracy.
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Some interpersonal trust researchers, however, still conceptualize trust as an observable
choice behavior. One of these perspectives conceptualizes trust behavior as relatively rational,
introduced largely from sociological, economic, and political fields (Kramer, 1999). This
perspective characterizes the trusting individual as motivated to make a rational, efficient choice
to maximize gains or minimize losses. Similar to normative decision models, this perspective is
left open to criticisms countering the assumption that humans are rational decision makers (cf.
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Simon, 1956). Clearly, humans do not always make rational
choices, as decisions are often influenced by fallible heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974),
framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).
Generally, interpersonal trust research has conceptualized trust-based behaviors as a
manifestation of psychological trust (Costa, Roe, & Thailleau, 2001). As such, trust behaviors
are not themselves characterized as trust, but the outcome of a particular level of psychological
trust (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; McAlister, 1995). Some researchers, however, have gone further
to reject trust behaviors entirely. For example, one meta-analysis on the role of trust in leadership
excluded articles that operationalized trust as a behavior, due to the “problematic” nature
associated with this practice (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002).
Muir (1994) argued trust cannot be observed but only inferred, and indeed some
researchers advocate trust be measured more directly via subjective assessment (e.g., Chancey et
al., 2015a; Key & Knox, 1970; Wiegmann et al., 2001). In response to this, several researchers
have tested for subjective trust as a mediator between signaling system error characteristics
(reliability, error bias) and dependence behaviors (e.g., compliance, reliance, reaction time,
response/agreement rate).
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Bustamante (2009) noted that for trust to be a mediator between system characteristics
and dependence behaviors, at least two criteria must be met: association and temporal
precedence. There is ample evidence to claim an association among system error characteristics,
dependence behaviors, and trust, theoretically (Cohen et al., 1998, Hoff & Bashir, 2015, Lee &
See, 2004, Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007, Muir, 1987, 1994) and empirically (Chancey et al.,
2015a; Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994; Muir, 1996; Wang et al., 2010). Bustamante (2009) suggested,
however, that empirical research has generally not accounted for temporal precedence in
experimental design, because researchers tend to measure trust after the behaviors have been
collected (however, see Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994 and Bliss, Hunt, Rice, & Geels, 2014, who
modeled trust development using time-series analysis techniques).
Bustamante (2009) conducted two experiments in which participants interacted with
either a FP or MP signaling system. To experimentally establish that trust preceded compliance
and reliance he measured trust halfway through the experimental sessions and analyzed only the
behaviors collected after the trust measure. The results from both experiments indicated lack of
mediation. Bustamante (2009) concluded that, although trust is related to compliance and
reliance, it might simply be a byproduct rather than a causal construct.
Using a similar paradigm, Wiczorek and Manzey (2009) allowed participants to interact
with unreliable FP signaling systems before measuring trust. The results from their study
indicated that the perceived reliability predicted the rate of compliance, with no mediating effect
of subjective trust. Similarly, Chancey et al. (2013) reported a study in which a more reliable FP
signaling system led to higher response rate and higher subjective trust, yet did not find evidence
to suggest trust mediated the relationship between reliability and response rate. Unfortunately,
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Chancey et al. (2013) measured trust following the behavioral reactions, making it difficult to
establish temporal precedence.
Recently, however, Chancey et al. (2015a) reported a study in which participants
interacted with unreliable signaling systems that were FP or MP. In this study trust was measured
halfway through the session and only the dependence behaviors following this measurement
were analyzed. Their results indicated that subjective trust partially mediated the relationship
between signaling system reliability and response rate. Trust did not, however, mediate the
relationships between error bias (FP, MP) and response rate or reaction time, nor between
reliability and reaction time. However, higher reliability led to a higher response rate, quicker
reaction time, and higher subjective trust.
Baron and Kenny (1986) noted that one of the assumptions of mediation is that the
mediator should be measured without error. Muir (1994) makes the cogent argument that it is
difficult to research trust experimentally, because it is a hypothetical construct and cannot
physically be observed or measured directly (p. 1909). It may be that the preceding studies failed
to find a strong mediating effect of subjective trust on behavior due to the measures employed.
Chancey et al. (2013) and Chancey et al. (2015a) used the 12-item questionnaire developed by
Jian, Bisantz, and Drury (2000), which was generated empirically rather than based on any
specific theory. Bustamante (2009) used three items from the Jian et al. (2000) questionnaire.
Wiczorek and Manzey (2010) used a single-item questionnaire, assessing trust in alarms.
Certainly, the ambiguity of trust reflects the extensive history in which trust has been
conceptualized as intuitive to the point of under-specification. This under-specification may have
led researchers to overlook instances in which trust is not the likely operant variable in the
compliance-reliance paradigm. Additionally, trust is qualitatively different depending upon the
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circumstances. The following section argues how the “two types of trust” observed in
compliance-reliance research may be different and concludes with the purpose of the current
work. Specifically, trust may be less robust in the MP-reliance relationship than the FPcompliance relationship.
Study Purpose: Trust and the Compliance-Reliance Paradigm
From established theories, unreliable systems should degrade trust, which should then
lead to a reduction in or absence of reactions from the operator. Yet, as Lee and See (2004)
suggested, the robustness or stability of trust depends upon the degree to which the goal-oriented
information (i.e., performance, process, purpose) of the automation provides the basis to form
that trust. The degree to which the informational bases of trust are available (i.e., purpose,
process, performance) determines the appropriateness of trust (i.e., calibration, resolution,
specificity), which subsequently guides the appropriateness of reaction behaviors (i.e., either
misuse, disuse, or appropriate use of automation). The way in which this information is
conveyed, however, depends on the type of automation, how the automation is contextualized,
and, pertinent to the current work, the differences between systems that are compliant or reliant
oriented (Lee & See, 2004).
Salient Choice. Clearly, FP systems are qualitatively different from MP systems,
particularly in relation to error saliency (Rice & McCarley, 2011). Laboratory context may have
underplayed the causal nature of trust and its ability to distinguish compliance from reliance. To
demonstrate that trust is a more robust predictor of behavior under certain conditions, Chancey et
al. (2015b) reanalyzed the data from Chancey et al. (2015a) to distinguish compliance from
reliance. As expected, the FP system affected compliance but not reliance. Alternatively, the MP
system affected reliance but not compliance. Interestingly, however, subjective trust partially
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mediated the relationship between reliability and compliance for the FP systems, but not the
relationship between reliability and reliance for the MP systems. This suggests that the subjective
evaluation of the operator’s own attitude toward the system is qualitatively different depending
on the error bias.
Chancey et al. (2015b) noted that false alarms present a salient, explicit choice to comply
or not. Alternatively, misses give a non-salient, implicit choice to rely or not.
For an operator to intervene in spite of the absence of a signal, such as in the MP-reliance
relationship, requires the operator to notice the absence of a cue (e.g., alarm, alert, advisory), a
task that humans perform poorly (Hearst, 1991). The absence of a cue represents the key
compliance-reliance distinction. It should be noted, however, in some cases the operator may
notice an alternative cue from the alarm, which could then trigger a reaction behavior (e.g., if a
building occupant smells smoke and evacuates, even though the fire alarm has not sounded). Yet
if the monitored system is opaque (due to the complexity or absence of raw data), the operator
will not be afforded the opportunity to evaluate alternative cues.
To this point, the user perspective of reliability proposed by Sullivan et al. (2008) is the
subjective proportion of only false alarms, because missed events are unnoticed. Mirroring this,
one of the characteristics of trust that distinguish it from other constructs such as confidence, is
that the individual must choose one action in preference to another (Luhmann, 1988; Mayer et
al., 1995). Lee and See (2004) proposed that trust develops from observations of automation
behavior (i.e., performance). The observation of performance can contribute to evidence that
buffers or develops existing trust based on alternative levels of attributional abstraction (i.e.,
process, purpose). Yet, the clear faulty behavior associated with a false alarm is more likely to
act causally through operator trust because of its salience to the operator. From this perspective,
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trust is likely more sensitive to signaling system false alarms than misses because it provides
salient information to evaluate whether or not the system can achieve an operator’s goals (i.e.,
performance). This leads to the second component, the notion of perceived risk and vulnerability
toward the automation in achieving the operator’s goals.
Risk of Dependence. A plausible reason why Chancey et al. (2015a) did not find trust to
be a strong mediator is because the strength of this effect depends upon the vulnerability of the
operator toward the automation (Lee & See, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995, 2007). If participants do
not feel risk when ignoring signals, trust has less influence upon the dependence behavior. Mayer
et al. (1995, 2007) argued that risk is an essential component in modeling trust, where trust was
characterized as a willingness to be vulnerable to another party. Simply having a willingness to
be vulnerable, however, does not require an individual to take on any risk. Specifically, risk is
integral in the behavioral demonstration of trust, whereby the trustor is not only willing to be
vulnerable (i.e., trust) but actually assumes the risk (i.e., automation dependence; see bolded
“Risk” moderating relationship in Figure 3).

37

Figure 3. Modified “Proposed Model of Trust” by Mayer et al., (1995). aLee and See’s (2004)
dimensions describing the bases of trust. bAutomation compliance and reliance described as
behavioral manifestations of trust.

Conditions for Dependence. Based on the preceding argument, the key conditions that
allow trust to mediate the relationship between the error characteristics of signaling systems and
dependence behaviors are: (condition 1) The operator is presented with a salient choice to
depend on the signaling system and (condition 2) the risk associated with non-dependence is
recognized. If these two conditions exist then one of two outcomes is possible: 1.) If trust in the
system is higher than the risk of non-dependence, then the operator will depend upon the system
or 2.) If trust in the system is lower than the risk of non-dependence, then the operator will not
depend upon the system.
An example of this would be a pilot who engages in a violent course correction following
a collision avoidance alarm. The pilot, in this case, trusts the alarm (condition 1) more than the
risk associated with not complying with it, potentially leading to a midair collision (condition 2).
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Moreover, by taking evasive action the pilot receives performance feedback. Trust should then
grow if the pilot can confirm loss of separation (i.e., hit), or decline if the loss of separation
cannot be confirmed (i.e., false alarm). Comparably, early instantiations of Ground Proximity
Warning Systems produced a large number of false alarms, which led pilots to report a lack of
trust in the system and to describe their evasive maneuvers as safety hazards (Pritchett et al.,
2002, p. 194).
Alternatively, if the user does not recognize a choice (condition 1), and thus possibly
does not recognize the risk involved in deviating from the current state (condition 2), then trust is
less likely to act as a causative factor. In the case of signaling system misses, where the operator
is not presented with a signal, there is no apparent or salient choice and the status quo should be
maintained (barring instances of alternative non-alarm cues). Therefore, trust may be less
impactful in the MP-reliance relationship (cf. Chancey et al. 2015b). This is not to suggest that
trust does not or cannot mediate the relationship between misses and reliance, particularly if the
trustor is aware of how the automation is likely to behave (i.e., process) or if it is being used for
what it was designed to do (i.e., purpose). What is lacking is the cue for the operator to evaluate
the behavior (i.e., performance) of the automation and recognize that it is missing signal events
(i.e., trust is more volatile due to the informational basis deficiency). Moreover, if trust were to
play a role in determining behavior, dispositional trust might be more predictive than affective
trust.
Additionally, even if presented with a salient choice (condition 1), if the user is not made
vulnerable by depending or not depending upon a signaling system (condition 2), then trust is
also less relevant. Consequently, trust can fluctuate from high to low but not strongly determine
the dependence behavior (cf., Mayer et al., 1995). Again, this is a plausible alternative
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explanation for the results reported by Bustamante (2010), Chancey et al. (2013), and Wiczorek
and Manzey (2011). These studies were conducted in controlled laboratory conditions, in which
risk of response behaviors was minimal. Such paradigms, though convenient and controllable,
lack ecological validity (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005).
The primary purpose of the current work is to empirically test the preceding argument to
determine how the bases of trust (i.e., performance, process, purpose) mediate the relationships
between FP or MP systems and dependence behaviors (i.e., compliance and reliance). Moreover,
risk likely modifies the degree to which trust mediates these relationships at all. Specifically, the
second goal of this research is to investigate if the vulnerability of participants in high and low
risk groups modifies the mediating influence of trust.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses reflect the preceding theoretical and empirical review of
signaling system characteristics and dependence behavior:
Moderated Mediation Hypotheses:
In reference to the models in Figure 4, the criteria of a mediator is often conveyed in
terms of the causal steps approach: “(a) variations in levels of the independent variable
significantly account for variations in the presumed mediator (i.e., Path a), (b) variations in the
mediator significantly account for variation in the depended variable (i.e., Path b), and (c) when
Paths a and b are controlled, a previously significant relation between the independent and
dependent variables is no longer significant, with the strongest demonstration of mediation
occurring when Path c′ is zero” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176).
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of a direct effect and simple mediation model. A illustrates a
total effect and B illustrates a mediation design. Adapted from “Asymptotic and Resampling
Strategies for Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models,” by K. J.
Preacher and A. F. Hayes, Behavior Research Methods, 40 (3), p. 880. Copyright 2008 by
Psychonomic Society, Inc.

However, to test whether trust mediates the relationships between reliability and
compliance for the FP systems or between reliability and reliance for the MP systems, a method
advocated by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008; Hayes, 2009) will be used. This method employs
bootstrapping to determine if the indirect effect of the mediator is significant (i.e., the product of
path a and b in Figure 4). Although the traditional perspective on mediation assumes that path c
was initially significant, an indirect effect does not. It is possible, therefore, to find a significant
indirect effect without an initially significant total effect (i.e. Figure 4A). Some researchers
suggest that a significant indirect effect can be interpreted as a mediator, even in the absence of
the initially significant total effect (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Hayes, 2009; Shrout
& Bolger, 2002). For example, if a model has two mediators working in opposite directions, this
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could result in two significant indirect effects in the absence of a total effect. Hayes (2009)
argued that failing to test for indirect effects in the absence of a total effect may lead researchers
to miss instances where X affects Y through unanticipated mechanisms. Therefore, based on the
pervasive theoretical presumption that trust mediates the relationships between error
characteristics and dependence behaviors, the current work will interpret significant indirect
effects as evidence of mediation. Moreover, although researchers generally refer to mediational
processes as full or partial, the current work will consult the effect size calculation of κ2
(proportion of maximum observed indirect effect) proposed by Preacher and Kelley (2011) for
simple mediation analyses. For this effect size parameter, κ2 = 0 implies that there is no linear
indirect effect and κ2 = 1 implies that the indirect effect is as large as it potentially could have
been. Additionally, the ratio of indirect to total effect will also be consulted (Pm), which is the
most commonly reported effect size measure for mediation analyses.
To determine if the indirect effect of trust is significant, bootstrap confidence intervals
are created whereby the middle 95% of the resampled means are retained and the upper 2.5%
and lower 2.5% of the means are dropped. The 95% confidence intervals will be examined to
determine if the indirect effect is significantly different from 0 (i.e., signficance is p < .05, twotailed), which indicates a mediated process. It should be noted that in small samples the
assumption of normality is not generally met, yet the proposed bootstrap method is a
nonparametric technique that does not require this assumption. Moreover, Preacher and Hayes
(2008) recommend the use of the bootstrapping approach over other methods (e.g., Sobel test,
causal steps approach), on the grounds that this approach has higher power while maintaining
reasonable control over Type I error rate (p. 880).
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Extending the analysis of mediation, the current work will employ a moderated mediation
model to test if risk modifies the degree to which trust mediates the tested relationships, by
looking at conditional indirect effects for participants in a high risk group versus a low risk
group. Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) define a conditional indirect effect as “the magnitude
of an indirect effect at a particular value of a moderator” (p. 186). In addition to probing for
moderated mediation by looking at conditional indirect effects, indexs of moderated mediation
will also be reported. Hayes (2015) proposes that “a mediation process can be said to be
moderated if the proposed moderator variable has a nonzero weight in the function linking the
indirect effect of X on Y through M to the moderator” (p. 7). Hayes (2015) goes on to propose
that moderated mediation can be tested by whether this weight, called the index of moderated
mediation, is different from zero. Again, bootstraped 95% confidence intervals for the index of
moderated mediation can be created, where the mediational process is considered moderated if
the confidence intervals do not contain zero (i.e., signficance is p < .05, two-tailed).
The theoretical framework used in the current study specifies that risk modifies the
degree to which trust affects the outcome behavior, where error characteristics may cause trust to
fluctuate from high to low without then causing the outcome behavior in the absence of risk (see
Figure 3). This conceptualization places the moderating effect on the mediator on path b (the
effect of M on Y), wich is refered to as a second stage moderation model (Hayes, 2015; Figure
5). Additionally, trust factors of performance, process, and purpose, will be analyzed in a parallel
multiple-mediation model. With the parallel model, there is no assumption as to the possible
causal influence between each factor (e.g., the performance factor does not necessarily affect the
process factor before affecting the dependence behavior). The theoretical justification for this is
specified by Lee and See’s (2004) proposal that, unlike interpersonal trust development (cf.
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Mayer et al., 1995; Rempel et al., 1985), human-automation trust does not necessarily follow a
pre-defined sequence of atributional abstraction. Yet, although Lee and See (2004) do not
propose a specified causal flow among the bases, they do not necessarily suggest the bases
cannot or will not affect each other. Therefore, follow-up serial mediation models specifying the
causal flow of performance on process and then purpose will also be conducted.

Figure 5. Moderated mediation depicted conceptually and statistically.
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H1 – As reflected in Figure 6-H1, trust will mediate the relationship between signaling
system reliability and compliance for FP systems (Lee & See, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Rice, 2009).
This is similar to Meyer’s (2001) initial conceptualization of the FP-Compliance relationship
(see Figure 2B). Supporting this hypothesis, recent empirical evidence showed that trust partially
mediated this relationship (Chancey et al. 2015b). Yet, some researchers have suggested trust in
an unreliable system is not a strong determinant of compliance, based on several studies that
found trust did not mediate this relationship (Bustamante, 2009; Chancey et al., 2013; Wiczorek
& Manzey, 2010). It is unclear if this is due to the atheoretical questionnaires employed in these
studies. To investigate this possibility, the current study assesses trust from a theoretical
perspective via subjective evaluations based on signaling system performance, process, and
purpose (Lee and See, 2004). Moreover, this lack of evidence may be due to the absence of risk
in depending upon the automation (see H3 below).
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Figure 6. Hypothesized model reflecting signaling system errors on dependence (Similar to the
model in Figure 2B, with the addition of risk moderating the effect of trust; i.e., model in Figure
3). Solid arrows indicate strong effect, whereas dashed arrows indicate weak affect.

H2 – Similar to the first hypothesis, trust will mediate the relationship between reliability
and dependence rate for the FP signaling system (Chancey et al., 2015b; Lee & See, 2004).
H3 – As reflected in Figure 6-H3, the degree to which trust mediates any of the tested
relationships will depend upon the degree of risk associated with not maintaining a high level of
performance on the experimental tasks (Lee & See, 2004; see Figure 3). Specifically, risk will
moderate the mediating effect of trust in the tested relationships (Mayer et al., 1995;
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2008).
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H4 –Trust based on performance will not mediate the relationship between reliability and
reliance for the MP system. Moreover, because of this, trust will not mediate the relationship at
all (cf. Bustamante, 2009; Chancey et al., 2015b; see Figure 6-H4).
H5 – Similar to the fourth hypothesis, trust will not mediate the relationship between
reliability and dependence rate for the MP signaling system (Chancey et al., 2015b).
Effects of Reliability, Error Bias, and Risk Hypotheses. (H6) Higher reliability will
lead to higher subjective ratings of trust (Chancey et al., 2015a; Lee & See, 2004). An interaction
is expected, where higher reliability should lead to higher compliance and reliance, yet this will
depend on the error bias. Specifically, the FP system will more directly impact compliance (H7)
and the MP system will more directly impact reliance (H8) (Dixon, 2001; Chancey et al., 2015b;
Rice, 2009). (H9) Finally, as a manipulation check, participants in the high-risk group will report
higher perceived risk ratings than those in the low-risk group.
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METHOD
Design
This study employed a 2 (error bias: FP or MP signaling system) × 2 (reliability: 90% or
60% reliable signaling system) × 2 (risk: high risk or low risk) split-plot design. The signaling
system task was modeled after the tank-spotting tasks used in similar studies of compliance and
reliance (e.g., Bustamante, 2009; Rice, 2009). For the tank-spotting task, participants made
judgments about the presence or absence of a tank embedded in a series of aerial pictures.
Participants completed this task with the aid of a signaling system that issued an alarm if it
suspected that a tank was in the picture. This represented a transparent system, because it
allowed participants to visually cross-check the accuracy of the signaling system. In addition to
the signaling system task, participants were also required to perform two additional tasks from
the Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB II; i.e., resource management and the compensatory
tracking tasks; Santiago-Espada, Myer, Latorella, & Comstock, 2011). This experimental
paradigm approximated flight simulation and accommodated contextual elements that allowed
for independent variable manipulation and sensitive recording of participant responses and
attitudes (e.g., transparent automation, multi-tasking, manipulation of signaling system reliability
and error bias).
Independent Variables. Error bias of the signaling system was a fixed, between-subjects
variable with two levels. The false alarm prone (FP) system committed false alarm errors only.
The missed alarm prone (MP) system committed misses only. Reliability was a fixed, withinsubjects variable with two levels: 90% reliable and 60% reliable. Reliability indicated the
percentage of trials in which the signaling system was programmed to correctly indicate a tank
present or tank absent out of the total number of aerial pictures presented.
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Before interacting with each of the 60% and 90% reliable signaling systems, participants
were informed that the systems are not perfectly reliable. Participants were not informed of the
specific reliability or error bias, to ensure that trust levels resulting from the independent variable
manipulations were given equal chances to develop across groups and conditions. Therefore, if
specific error characteristic information were disclosed, trust could reflect information associated
with each error bias rather than from direct automation interactions and observations.
Participants were told that the 90% reliable automation “tends to be pretty reliable, so it probably
won’t make a lot of mistakes” and that the 60% reliable automation “tends to be pretty
unreliable, so it probably will make a lot of mistakes.”
To elicit measurable response differences, the reliability levels of 60% and 90% were
chosen to be above and below the 70% crossover point reported by Wickens and Dixon (2007).
Reliability of the signaling system was manipulated similar to previous studies using the FP/MP
manipulation (e.g., Bustamante, 2009; Chancey et al., 2015a; Dixon et al. 2007, Meyer et al.,
2014; Rice, 2009). Additionally, 50% of the aerial pictures had a tank (i.e., signal present) and
50% did not (i.e., signal absent). The signal detection response matrix according to error bias and
reliability appears in Table 3.
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Table 3
Detection response matrix for the false alarm prone (FP) and miss prone (MP) systems
according to reliability for the signaling system task

90% FP

60% FP

90% MP

60% MP

Hits

30 (.50)

30 (.50)

24 (.40)

6 (.10)

False Alarms

6 (.10)

24 (.40)

0 (.00)

0 (.00)

Misses

0 (.00)

0 (.00)

6 (.10)

24 (.40)

Correct
Rejections

24 (.40)

6 (.10)

30 (.50)

30 (.50)

Note. Numbers outside of parentheses represent the raw number of responses per category that
will occur during the session. Numbers in parentheses represent the proportions of responses (out
of the total number of responses during each session).

Risk was a fixed, between-subjects variable with two levels: High risk, where the
consequences of performing poorly on the experimental tasks was additional time in the
experimental session without class credit to cover the additional time spent participating; and
low risk, where performing poorly on the experimental tasks carried no direct consequences. The
experiment always took approximately 1.5 hours to complete, regardless of the risk manipulation
(i.e., participants were informed of only the additional time). Participants were randomly
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assigned to error bias and risk groups and reliability conditions were counterbalanced across
groups.
Dependent Variables. To ensure that the trust measure temporally preceded dependence
behaviors, subjective trust was assessed halfway through each session. For the moderatedmediation and mediation analyses, only the dependence behaviors obtained after the trust
questionnaire were used in the analyses (cf. Bustamante, 2009; Chancey et al., 2015a). The
proportions of signaling system errors were equated for pre- and post-questionnaire
administration, to ensure that an experimental artifact was not mistaken for a particular effect. A
modified version of the “human-computer trust questionnaire” developed by Madsen and Gregor
(2000) was used to determine levels of operator trust (see Appendix B). A modified version of
the perceived risk questionnaire developed by Simon, Houghton, and Auino (1999) was used to
assess the perceived risk of performing poorly on the experimental tasks (see Appendix C).
Compliance was operationally defined as the number of times the participant responded
“Tank Found” when the signaling system issued an alarm, out of the total number of alarms the
signaling system issued (cf. Chancey et al., 2015b; Rice, 2009). Reliance was operationally
defined as the number of times the participant responded “No Tank” when the signaling system
remained silent, out of the total number of times the signaling system remained silent (cf.
Chancey et al., 2015b; Rice, 2009). Because manipulating error bias and reliability creates an
unequal number of opportunities for the participant to be reliant or compliant, overall
dependence rate was also collected (e.g., in the 90% FP group there were 36 opportunities for a
compliant response and 24 opportunities for a reliant response, whereas in the 90% MP group
there were 24 opportunities for a compliant response and 36 opportunities for a reliant response).
Therefore, dependence rate was operationally defined as the number of times the participant’s
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response matched the advice of the signaling system (i.e., signal present or signal absent) out of
the total number aerial pictures presented to the participant.
Performance measures were recorded for all of the experimental tasks. For the signaling
system task, response bias (c), sensitivity (d′), and reaction time (RT; seconds from onset of the
choice to respond “Tank Present” or “Tank Absent”) were recorded. For the compensatory
tracking task, the root mean square deviation of a reticle from the center point of a crosshair was
used to determine performance. For the resource management task, the amount of time that fuel
levels deviated from a pre-specified amount of 2,500 units was used to determine performance.
Participants
The R program PowMedR (Kenny, 2014) was used to conduct a power analysis based on
the standardized beta path coefficients reported by Chancey et al. (2015b; PowMedR
downloaded from http://www.davidakenny.net/progs/PowMedR.txt; coefficients were a = .745,
b = .444, c′ = .403). The analysis indicated that a total of 39 participants would be required to
achieve a power of .80 with a .331 effect size (standardized path coefficient) at an alpha level of
.05, to observe a significant indirect effect (ab) of trust on compliance for an unreliable FP
system (reliability 60% and 90%). Therefore, 88 participants were tested (56 females, 32 males),
where half were presented with FP systems (n = 44) and half were presented with MP systems (n
= 44). Participants self-reported an average age of 19.28 (SD = 2.13, Min = 18, Max = 28),
playing video games an average of 2.69 hours-per-week (SD = 5.08), and using computers (work
and recreation) an average of 17.55 hours-per-week (SD = 13.09). All participants reported
having normal (or corrected-to-normal) visual acuity at the time of participation. No participant
indicated having color deficiency or hearing impairment.
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A convenience sample of college students from Old Dominion University (ODU) was
used in the current study. Participants were enlisted through SONA, an online recruitment
management program used by the ODU Psychology Department (see Appendix D for
recruitment advertisement). Participants received research credits for participating in the 1.5hour-long study, which could be applied toward course credit at the instructors’ discretion.
Approval from ODU’s Institutional Review Board was obtained before data collection and
written informed consent was obtained from all participants before participation (see Appendix
A).
Materials/Apparati
Instruction Sheet. Participants were provided with an instruction sheet that contained
information about how to complete the MATB II tasks and the signaling system task (see
Appendix E). The experimenter read the instructions aloud to each participant, and the
participant was asked to read along with his or her own copy.
MATB II. The MATB II is a battery of programmable tasks that simulate pilot
responsibilities during flight (Santiago-Espada et al., 2011). Participants were responsible for
two of these tasks: the compensatory tracking task and the resource management task.
Compensatory Tracking Task (Figure 7). This task simulates the pilot’s function of
maintaining level flight while competing with environmental variables such as wind. Using a
joystick, participants attempted to keep a continuously drifting blue reticle at the center of a pair
of crosshairs. Performance was calculated as the root mean square deviation of the reticle from
the center point, which was sampled every 15 seconds and compiled in an output file.
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Figure 7. Screenshot of the compensatory tracking task.

Resource Management Task (Figure 8). This task represents a fuel management system.
Six tanks labeled A through D contain green fuel, which depletes over the course of the task.
Participants were tasked with transferring fuel from the supply tanks (E and F, which do not
deplete) to tanks A and B. Participants were asked to maintain the fuel levels in tanks A and B as
close to 2,500 units as possible (not above and not under). This task was accomplished by
activating pumps that connect each tank (labeled 1-6). Pumps were activated and deactivated by
pressing the corresponding number on a standalone ten-key number pad. Randomly, however,
these pumps temporarily turned red and no longer transferred fuel. The fuel levels in tanks A and
B were recorded every 30 seconds, where performance was determined by the difference from
2,500 units of fuel at these time points.
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Figure 8. Screenshot of the resource management task.

Signaling System Task. Using SuperEdit 4.7TM, the researcher developed the signaling
system task, which was presented using SuperCard 4.7TM software hosted on a Macintosh
desktop computer. The signaling system task was modeled after the tank spotting tasks used in
similar compliance-reliance studies (e.g., Bustamante, 2009; Rice, 2009). Participants were
required to view a series of aerial pictures and judge whether a tank was present or absent within
each picture. The images were 30 aerial pictures of Bagdad, Iraq, collected using GoogleMaps.
Images of tanks (see Figure 9) were embedded within each of these aerial pictures (see Figure
10). Across conditions, participants were exposed to the same 30 pictures with and without an
imbedded tank (resulting in 60 aerial pictures).
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Figure 9. Five types of embedded tanks.

Figure 10. Picture of tank embedded in an aerial photograph.

There was a delay between each aerial picture (randomized at 10, 14, or 18 seconds).
Aerial pictures appeared for 3 seconds before moving to a screen that asked for the participants’
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response. Participants were aided by a “Tank Spotting Aid,” which diagnosed the presence of a
tank in one of four quadrants of the image by surrounding it in red. If the aid diagnosed the
presence of a tank it also sounded an auditory alarm. If the aid diagnosed the absence of a tank it
did not sound an alarm and did not surround any quadrant in red. At the response screen, the
image was replaced by text indicating the tank spotting aid’s diagnosis (i.e., “Tank Found” or
“No Tank”). Additionally, participants were required to click a button labeled “No Tank” if they
did not believe the aerial picture contained a tank and click a button labeled “Tank Found” if
they believed the aerial picture contained a tank. Participants were not able to move to the next
picture until they clicked one of the two buttons. If a tank was in the picture, the aid never erred
by alarming an incorrect quadrant; participants were explicitly informed of this. This aid
represents the prototypical signaling system described in the section titled Sensor-based
Signaling Systems in the current work, in that it both aids with information acquisition by
selecting and filtering data (i.e., Stage 1 automation) and analyzes the available data to provide a
diagnosis (i.e., Stage 2 automation; see Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Signaling system task graphical depiction. 1) Delay between images randomized at
10, 14, and 18 seconds. 2) Aerial image presented for 3 seconds with visual and auditory alarm.
3) Screen presented after aerial image indicating the tank spotting aid’s diagnosis and requesting
the participant’s response.

The color red was chosen for the signaling system visual diagnostic cue, to comply with
the military standard for an alarm indicating hostile target identification (MIL-STD-1472G 11
January 2012). Tank Present alarms were accompanied by a tone that increased in frequency
from 700 to 1,700 Hz in 0.85 seconds, with an interruption interval of 0.12 seconds, to comply
with the military standard for aircrew station alerting systems indicating the existence of a
condition requiring immediate action (MIL-STD-411F March 1997). To help participants
evaluate their own performance on this task, a point bank was provided at the bottom of the task
window. Correct decisions (i.e., clicking Tank Found when a tank is in the photograph or
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clicking No Tank when a tank is not in the photograph) resulted in a 1-point increase to the bank.
Incorrect decisions (i.e., clicking Tank Found when a tank was not in the photograph or clicking
No Tank when a tank was in the photograph) resulted in a 1-point decrease to the bank.
Participants began each experimental session with 20 points, to avoid negative values. Points
were not associated with any substantial benefits, other than to provide participants with an
indication to monitor their own performance.
Trust questionnaire. A modified version of the “human-computer trust questionnaire”
developed by Madsen and Gregor (2000) was used to determine levels of operator trust (see
Appendix B). Importantly, this questionnaire closely matches the factors of performance,
process, and purpose identified by Lee and See (2004), where Madsen and Gregor (2000) instead
labeled similar factors of reliability, understandability, and faith, respectively (cf., Mayer et al.,
1995; Rempel et al., 1985). The questionnaire consisted of 15 statements accompanied by a 12point Likert scale asking participants to indicate their agreement from “Not at all” to “Very
Much.” In this study, the questionnaire showed adequate internal consistency for overall trust
(αCronbach’s = .97), as well as for the individual factors of performance (αCronbach’s = .96), process
(αCronbach’s = .91), and purpose (αCronbach’s = .93).
Perceived risk questionnaire. A modified version of the risk perception questionnaire
used by Simon et al. (1999) was used to measure the perceived risk associated with
consequences for performing poorly on the experimental tasks (see Appendix C). Simon et al.
(1999) reported that this measure showed an adequate internal consistency (αCronbach’s = .85) and
a factor analysis determined that the measure was unidimensional. The questionnaire showed an
adequate internal consistency in the current study as well (αCronbach’s = .85).
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Demographic form. Participants completed a demographic form at the beginning of the
experiment (see Appendix F); participants indicated their sex, age, computer experience,
videogame experience, hearing capability, visual acuity, color deficiency, and (if applicable)
whether they had corrective hearing or visual devices with them to complete the experiment.
Apparati. The MATB II and signaling system tasks were hosted on two separate desktop
computers (see Appendix G for picture of experimental setup). Participants performed the
MATBII tasks on a Dell OptiPlex 990, Intel® CoreTM i5 – 2500K CPU, with a Windows 7
operating system. Participants operated the compensatory tracking task with a Microsoft
SideWinder Precision 2 Joystick and indicated their responses to the resource management tasks
by pressing number keys (1-6) on a ten-key number pad. The signaling system task was hosted
on a Macintosh desktop computer, which utilized OS X Yosemite version 10.10.3. Signaling
system auditory alarms were presented by RadioShack® PRO-100 Communications Headset
headphones. Two separate 12-inch Gateway FDP monitors (1730 for the PC and 1765 for the
Mac) visually presented both tasks.
SPSS PROCESS Macro. To test the proposed moderated mediation and mediation
models, a macro developed by Hayes (2013), referred to as PROCESS (v2.13), was used. This
macro is compatible with SPSS and can be downloaded from http://www.afhayes.com, and has
been used in other studies to test for mediation (Chancey et al., 2015a; Chancey et al., 2013;
Merritt & Ilgen, 2009).
Procedure
After arriving at the testing location, participants were asked to complete the Informed
Consent Form (Appendix A) and then the demographics form (Appendix F). Participants then
received the experimental instructions, which were also read aloud by the researcher (Appendix

60

E). To accommodate the between-subjects variable of risk, half of the participants (randomized)
received instructions indicating a “high risk” of adverse consequences associated with poor
performance and the other half received instructions indicating a “low risk” of adverse
consequences associated with poor performance. Following instructions, participants were then
asked to practice the MATB II tasks alone and in combination (approximately 5 minutes).
Participants were then asked to search through 10 aerial images that had a single tank embedded
and indicate where in the image the tank was. All participants were required to find the tank
before proceeding to the next image. Following the familiarization session, participants were
asked to fill out the perceived risk questionnaire (Appendix C). Following this, participants
completed a 10-minute practice session with the three tasks, where the signaling system was
100% reliable. Aerial images used in the practice session where not used in the experimental
sessions.
Following the practice session, all participants then completed two 20-minute
experimental sessions, where the signaling system varied in reliability for each session (90% and
60%). Participants were informed of the general reliability qualities of the signaling system
before each session; the order of presentation was counterbalanced across participants. To
accommodate the between-subjects variable of error bias, half of the participants experienced
signaling systems that were FP only and the other half experienced signaling systems that were
MP only (randomized). Halfway through all sessions, participants were presented with the trust
questionnaire (Appendix B). Following the completion of this questionnaire, participants then
completed the remainder of the session (see Figure 12).

61

30 Aerial Images and
Responses (Not Analyzed)
10 Minutes

Trust Questionnaire

30 Aerial Images and
Responses (Analyzed)
10 Minutes

Figure 12. Graphical depiction of experimental process.

Following the two 20-minute sessions, participants were debriefed. For participants in the
High-Risk group, this included informing them of the risk manipulation. Participants in the High
Risk group were asked not to disclose this manipulation to other students who may participate in
the study. Participants were then thanked and awarded research credit for their participation. The
session lasted approximately 1.5 hours per participant.
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics were calculated and are presented in Appendix H. Data were
transformed to be scaled from 0 as the min and 1 as the max. For example, a dependence rate (or
compliance/reliance rate) of 0 indicates no agreements with the alarm system, whereas a
dependence rate (or compliance/reliance rate) of 1 indicates perfect agreement with the alarm
system. Similarly, a trust rating of 0 indicates no trust in the alarm system, whereas a trust rating
of 1 indicates perfect trust in the alarm system.
The data were inspected for outliers, equal numbers among conditions and groups, and
histograms were created to visually observe if the variables were generally normally distributed.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA), however, is generally robust to violations of the normality
assumption (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004, p. 112). Levene’s tests were consulted to address the
assumption of homogeneity of variance for the between subjects manipulations, which was not
violated for any of the reported ANOVAs. The parallel moderated-mediation and mediation
(simple and serial) analyses used a non-parametric bootstrapping method that did not require the
assumption of normality. The moderated-mediation and mediation analyses employed standard
errors that were based on the HC3 estimator, to address the assumption of homoscedasticity
(Hayes & Cai, 2007). The moderated-mediation and mediation analyses were separated into FP
systems (n = 44) and MP systems (n = 44), and analyzed separately. An outlier-labeling rule with
a multiplier of 2.2 was consulted to identify outliers, and ensure that the results were not due to
anomalous data (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987). Two lower limit outliers were identified for reliance
(outlier labeled as reliance rate values less than .04), in which reliance rate was 0 for both
outliers. These data were adjusted to .32 to be .01 below the identified next lowest value of .33.
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To minimize the chances of making a Type I error, p < .05 was established to indicate
statistical significance. It should be noted that the selection of p < .05, which is heavily weighted
to minimize a Type I error, was selected because of the experimentally controlled nature of this
study and the existence of numerous studies and research supporting the ideas and proposed
hypotheses (i.e., less controlled applied studies are often underpowered and novel research is
often exploratory in nature, plausibly warranting an upward p value adjustment; Wickens, 1998).
Moreover, the p value is often rigidly interpreted dichotomously as “all-or-none,” which leaves
no room for interpretations of “practical significance” and thus increases the risk of a Type II
error. Yet it is more appropriately expressed as a level of confidence, which is better represented
as a continuous product (Wickens, 1998). Therefore, importantly, numerical effect sizes and
power estimates accompany analyses, and are consulted to interpret the degree to which
variables affected each other. To apportion power appropriately, hypotheses were tested before
omnibus higher order interactions were investigated. Non-hypothesized interactions were
interpreted by α corrected simple effects, where α = .05/b was used to establish significance of
the simple effect of independent variable (IV) a within specific levels of IV b (Maxwell &
Delaney, 2004, pp. 307-308).
Main Effects and Interactions
Perceived Risk. A two-way between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
of risk on perceived risk, F(1, 84) = 12.457, p = .001, partial η2 = .129, observed power = .937,
where participants in the high risk group (M = .584, SE = .032) assigned higher perceived risk
ratings to poor task performance than the low risk group (M = .426, SE = .032). Neither a
significant main effect of error bias, F(1, 84) = .048, p = .827, nor interaction between error bias
and risk group, F(1, 84) = 3.025, p = .086, was observed.
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Trust. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of reliability on subjective
trust, F(1, 84) = 185.795, p < .001, partial η2 = .689, observed power = 1.00, where participants
in the 90% reliability condition (M = .724, SE = .017) rated the signaling system significantly
more trustworthy than those in the 60% reliable condition (M = .465, SE = .018). Significant
effects were not observed for the main effect of error bias, F(1, 84) = 3.092, p = .082, main
effect of risk, F(1, 84) = .893, p = .347, interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = 1.054,
p = .208, interaction between reliability and risk, F(1, 84) < .001, p = .997, interaction between
error bias and reliability, F(1, 84) = 1.151, p = .286, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and
error bias, F(1, 84) = .428, p = .515.
Performance. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of reliability on the
performance factor of trust, F(1, 84) = 176.138, p < .001, partial η2 = .677, observed power =
1.00, where participants in the 90% reliability condition (M = .700, SE = .019) rated the
performance factor of trust higher than when in the 60% reliable condition (M = .396, SE =
.020). There was also a significant main effect of error bias, F(1, 84) = 4.090, p = .046, partial
η2 = .046, observed power = .516, where participants in the FP group (M = .580, SE = .022) rated
the performance factor of trust higher than the MP group (M = .516, SE = .022). Significant
effects were not observed for the main effect of risk, F(1, 84) = .335, p = .564, interaction
between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = 1.140, p = .289, interaction between reliability and risk,
F(1, 84) = .043, p = .176, interaction between error bias and reliability, F(1, 84) = 1.862, p =
.176, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error bias, F(1, 84) = 1.729, p = .192.
Process. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of reliability on the
process factor of trust, F(1, 84) = 103.695, p < .001, partial η2 = .552, observed power = 1.00,
where participants in the 90% reliability condition (M = .776, SE = .017) rated the process factor
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of trust higher than when in the 60% reliable condition (M = .582, SE = .022). Significant effects
were not observed for the main effect of error bias, F(1, 84) = 1.628, p = .205, main effect of
risk, F(1, 84) = .874, p = .352, interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = 1.047, p =
.309, interaction between reliability and risk, F(1, 84) =.431, p = .513, interaction between error
bias and reliability, F(1, 84) = .837, p = .363, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error
bias, F(1, 84) = .089, p = .766.
Purpose. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of reliability on the
purpose factor of trust, F(1, 84) = 195.869, p < .001, partial η2 = .700, observed power = 1.00,
where participants in the 90% reliability condition (M = .696, SE = .018) rated the purpose factor
of trust higher than when in the 60% reliable condition (M = .471, SE = .019). Significant effects
were not observed for the main effect of error bias, F(1, 84) = 2.187, p = .143, main effect of
risk, F(1, 84) = 1.069, p = .304, interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = .453, p =
.503, interaction between reliability and risk, F(1, 84) =.144, p > .05, interaction between error
bias and reliability, F(1, 84) = .393, p = .705, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error
bias, F(1, 84) = .417, p = .520.
Dependence Rate. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
reliability and error bias on dependence rate, F(1, 84) = 17.762, p < .001, partial η2 = .175,
observed power = .986. A follow-up analysis on simple effects indicated that there was a
significant effect of reliability in both the FP, Wilk’s λ = .219, F(1, 84) = 300.370, p < .001,
partial η2 = .780, observed power = 1, and the MP group, Wilk’s λ = .394, F(1, 84) = 129.299, p
< .001, partial η2 = .606, observed power = 1. Alternatively, for the 60% reliable condition,
participants in the MP group agreed with the alarm system more often than those in the FP
group, F(1, 84) = 45.383, p < .001, partial η2 = .351, observed power = 1 (see Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Average dependence rate as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

Significant effects were not observed for the main effect of risk, F(1, 84) = .600, p =
.441, interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = .006, p = .936, interaction between risk
and reliability, F(1, 84) = .022, p = .882, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error bias,
F(1, 84) = 2.145, p = .147.
Compliance. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between reliability
and error bias on compliance rate, F(1, 84) = 77.446, p < .001, partial η2 = .480, observed power
= 1. A follow-up analysis on simple effects indicated that there was a significant effect of
reliability on compliance rate, but only in the FP group, Wilk’s λ = .346, F(1, 84) = 158.940, p <
.001, partial η2 = .65, observed power = 1 (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Average compliance rate as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

Significant effects were not observed for the main effect of risk, F(1, 84) = .095, p =
.759, interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = 1.522, p = .221, interaction between risk
and reliability, F(1, 84) = .581, p = .448, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error bias,
F(1, 84) = .581, p = 448.
Reliance. A split-plot ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between reliability and
error bias on reliance rate, F(1, 84) = 15.934, p < .001, partial η2 = .150, observed power = .972.
A follow-up analysis on simple effects indicated that there was a significant effect of reliability
on reliance rate, but only in the MP system, Wilk’s λ = .583, F(1, 84) = 60.179, p < .001, partial
η2 = .417, observed power = 1. It should be noted, however, the effect of reliability on reliance in
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the FP group approached significance, Wilk’s λ = .945, F(1, 84) = 4.879, p = .030 (greater than
the alpha corrected .025), partial η2 = .055, observed power = .588. Alternatively, the FP and MP
groups were significantly different for both the 90% condition, F(1, 84) = 6.366, p = .014,
partial η2 = .070, observed power = .703, and 60% condition, F(1, 84) = 33.613, p < .001, partial
η2 = .286, observed power = 1 (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Average reliance rate as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

Significance was not observed for the main effect of risk, F(1, 84) = .047, p = .829,
interaction between error bias and risk, F(1, 84) = .606, p = .438, interaction between risk and
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reliability, F(1, 84) < .001, p = .987, nor interaction among reliability, risk, and error bias, F(1,
84) = 1.240, p = .269.
Primary task performance. A significant main effect of risk on tracking task
performance was observed, F(1, 84) = 10.418, p = .002, partial η2 = .110, observed power =
.891. Participants in the high risk group (M = 39.893, SE = 1.372) kept the drifting reticle
significantly more stable than those in the low risk group (M = 46.157, SE = 1.372). No other
main effects or interactions were observed for tracking task performance (p > .05). For resource
management performance, no significant main effects or interactions were observed (p > .05).
Secondary task performance. A significant interaction between reliability and error bias
on sensitivity (i.e., d′) was observed, F(1, 84) = 19.724, p < .001, partial η2 = .190, observed
power = .992. A follow-up analysis on simple effects indicated that there was a significant effect
of reliability on sensitivity for both the FP, Wilk’s λ = .757, F(1, 84) = 26.986, p < .001, partial
η2 = .243, observed power = 999, and MP groups, Wilk’s λ = .389, F(1, 84) = 131.688, p < .001,
partial η2 = .611, observed power = 1. Alternatively, there was a significant effect of error bias,
but only in the 60% reliability group, F(1, 84) = 19.310, p < .001, partial η2 = .187, observed
power = 991 (see Figure 16). No other main effects or interactions were observed for sensitivity
(p > .05).
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Figure 16. Average sensitivity (d′) as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

A significant interaction between reliability and error bias on alarm score was observed,
F(1, 84) = 22.464, p < .001, partial η2 = .211, observed power = .997. A follow-up analysis on
simple effects indicated that there was a significant effect of reliability on score for both the FP,
Wilk’s λ = .782, F(1, 84) = 23.470, p < .001, partial η2 = .218, observed power = 998, and MP
groups, Wilk’s λ = .386, F(1, 84) = 133.342, p < .001, partial η2 = .614, observed power = 1.
Alternatively, there was a significant effect of error bias, but only in the 60% reliability group,
F(1, 84) = 22.528, p < .001, partial η2 = .211, observed power = 997 (see Figure 17). No other
main effects or interactions were observed for score (p > .05).
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Figure 17. Average secondary alarm-task score as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and
error bias

A significant interaction between reliability and error bias on RT was observed, F(1, 84)
= 3.982, p = .049, partial η2 = .045, observed power = .505. A follow-up analysis of simple
effects indicated that there was a significant effect of reliability on RT, but only in the FP group,
Wilk’s λ = .934, F(1, 84) = 5.902, p = .017, partial η2 = .066. Alternatively, there was a
significant effect of error bias, but only in the 60% reliability group, F(1, 84) = 11.155, p = .001,
partial η2 = .117, observed power = 910 (see Figure 18). No other main effects or interactions
were observed for RT (p > .05).
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Figure 18. Average RT (seconds) as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

A significant interaction between reliability and error bias on response bias (i.e., c) was
observed, F(1, 84) = 10.609, p = .002, partial η2 = .112 observed power = .896. A follow-up
analysis of simple effects indicated that there was a significant effect of reliability on response
bias, but only in the FP group, Wilk’s λ = .876, F(1, 84) = 11.906, p = .001, partial η2 = .124.
Specifically, the 90% condition tended to respond as though a tank was present (M = -.078, SE =
.046) and the 60% condition tended to respond as though there was no tank (M = .114, SE =
.042). Alternatively, there was a significant effect of error bias for both the 90% condition, F(1,
84) = 49.419, p < .001, partial η2 = .370, observed power = 1, and the 60% condition, F(1, 84) =
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12.242, p = .001, partial η2 = .127, observed power = .933 (see Figure 19). No other main effects
or interactions were observed for response bias (p > .05).

Figure 19. Average response bias (c) as a function of reliability (90% and 60%) and error bias.

False Alarm Prone Systems: Mediation Analyses
Trust. For the FP systems, general trust (i.e., performance, process, and purpose) did not
mediate the relationships between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for
either the high or low risk groups. Follow-up simple mediation analyses, not accounting for the
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moderating effect of risk, are presented below (see Tables 4 and 5). Although no significant
effects were found, effect sizes for simple mediation analyses were consulted to allow for a
comparison with Chancey et al. (2015b), which reported significant indirect effects of trust on
both compliance and dependence rate. For the mediating effect of trust between reliability and
compliance, the proportion of the maximum observed indirect effect was κ2 = .112 (SE = .056,
95% CI [.009, .222]). Additionally, for the mediating effect of trust between reliability and
dependence rate, the proportion of the maximum observed indirect effect was κ2 = .088 (SE =
.054, 95% CI [.005, .203]).

Table 4
Path coefficients for the false alarm prone system simple-mediation models.

Source
a

Compliance
.239***
(.036)
.097
b
(.058)
.295***
c
(.019)
.274***
c′
(.024)
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Reliance
.239***
(.036)
.062
(.129)
.074
(.043)
.059
(.053)

Dependence Rate
.239***
(.036)
.069
(.055)
.311***
(.019)
.294***
(.023)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 4 for corresponding model paths (X =
Reliability, M = trust, Y = Compliance, Reliance, Dependence Rate).
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Table 5
Indirect effects of trust for false alarm prone system reliability on compliance, reliance, and
dependence rate through subjective estimates of signaling system trust.

Source

Point
Estimate

SE

Bootstrapping 95% CI
Lower
Upper

Compliance

.023

.014

-.002

.053

Reliance

.015

.027

-.039

.067

Dependence Rate

.017

.014

-.009

.046

Note. Data bootstrapped (10,000).

Performance. For the FP systems, the performance factor of trust did not mediate the
relationships between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for either the
high or low risk groups.
Process. For the FP systems, the process factor of trust did not mediate the relationships
between reliability and compliance nor dependence rate, for either the high or low risk groups.
The process factor did, however, mediate the relationship between reliability and reliance, but
only for the high risk group (i.e., risk moderated the mediating effect of the process component
of trust). Specifically, a significant conditional indirect effect was observed in the high risk
group, ab = .057, SE = .033, 95% CI (.006, .136), but not in the low risk group, ab = -.062, SE =
.066, 95% CI (-.047, .215). For the high risk group, participants in the 90% reliability condition
relied on the system at a rate of .057 times more than those in the 60% reliability condition, as a
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result of the process factor of trust. However, the conditional indirect effects between the high
and low risk groups were not significantly different from each other, index of moderated
mediation = .005, SE = .071, 95% CI (-.0124, .162).
A follow-up simple mediation analysis, not accounting for the moderating effect of risk,
indicated that the proportion of the maximum observed indirect effect was κ2 = .064 (SE = .039,
95% CI [.006, .163]) for the mediating effect of the process component of trust between
reliability and reliance. Yet, when not accounting for the moderating effect of risk, a significant
indirect effect of the process component of trust was not observed (ab = .028, SE = .019, 95% CI
[-.0004, .082]).
Purpose. For the FP systems, the purpose factor of trust did not mediate the relationships
between reliability and reliance nor dependence rate, for either the high or low risk groups. The
purpose factor did, however, mediate the relationship between reliability and compliance, but
only for the high risk group (i.e., risk moderated the mediating effect of the purpose component
of trust). Specifically, a significant conditional indirect effect was observed in the high risk
group, ab = .088, SE = .043, 95% CI (.002, .172), but not in the low risk group, ab = .044, SE =
.062, 95% CI (-.083, .166). For the high risk group, participants in the 90% reliability condition
complied with the system at a rate of .088 times more than those in the 60% reliability condition,
as a result of the purpose factor of trust. However, the conditional indirect effects between the
high and low risk groups were not significantly different from each other, index of moderated
mediation = .044, SE = .075, 95% CI (-.104, .194).
A follow-up simple mediation analysis, not accounting for the moderating effect of risk,
indicated that the proportion of the maximum observed indirect effect was κ2 = .131 (SE = .054,
95% CI [.025, .238]) for the mediating effect of the purpose component of trust between
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reliability and compliance. Not accounting for the moderating effect of risk still revealed a
significant indirect effect of the purpose component of trust (ab = .028, SE = .014, 95% CI [.004,
.060]).
Follow-up Serial Mediation Analyses. Serial mediation analyses, using the risk group
as a covariate, revealed that the indirect effect of performance, process, and then purpose,
significantly indirectly affected compliance rate through all three of the bases of trust
sequentially (indirect effect = .009, SE = .005, 95% CI [.0003, .021]). In other words, higher
reliability led to higher ratings of performance (a1 = .273, SE = .040, p < .001), which led to
higher ratings of process (d21 = .645, SE = 125, p < .001), which led to higher ratings of purpose
(d32 =.190, SE = .046, p < .001), and ultimately resulted in a higher compliance rate (b3 =.264, SE
= .129, p = .043). For this analysis, the ratio of indirect to total effect of reliability on compliance
rate was Pm= .029 (SE = .018, 95% CI [.001, .072]). However, a stronger effect was observed for
the sequential indirect effect of performance through purpose on compliance rate (indirect effect
= .053, SE = .027, 95% CI [.002, .106]). Independent of the effect of the process component,
higher reliability resulted in a higher performance rating (a1 = .273, SE = .040, p < .001) which
led to a higher purpose rating (d31 = .740, SE = .060, p < .001) and ultimately led to a higher
compliance rate (b3 = .264, SE = .129, p = .043). For this analysis, the ratio of indirect to total
effect of reliability on compliance rate was Pm= .194 (SE = .099, 95% CI [.007, .398]).

78

Figure 20. Serial mediation process model. Note: Adapted from “Introduction to Mediation,
Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis,” by A.F. Hayes, p. 145. Copyright 2013 by The
Guilford Press.

Additionally, a significant indirect effect of performance through process on reliance rate
was observed (indirect effect = .057, SE = .034, 95% CI [.005, .139]). Independent of the effect
of the purpose component, higher reliability resulted in a higher performance ratings (a1 = .273,
SE = .040, p < .001) which led to a higher process ratings (d21 = .645, SE = 125, p < .001) and
ultimately led to a higher reliance rate (b2 = .329, SE = 162, p = .045).
Miss Prone Systems: Mediation Analyses
Trust. For the MP systems, general trust (i.e., performance, process, and purpose) did not
mediate the relationships between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for
either the high or low risk groups. Follow-up simple mediation analyses, not accounting for the
moderating effect of risk, are presented below (see Tables 6 and 7).
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Table 6
Path coefficients for the miss prone system, simple-mediation models.

Source
a

Compliance
.279***
(.034)
.154
b
(.083)
.004
c
(.026)
-.039
c′
(.035)
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Reliance
.0279***
(.034)
.133
(.076)
.208***
(.024)
.171***
(.032)

Dependence Rate
.279***
(.034)
.109
(.062)
.204***
(.019)
.173***
(.026)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 4 for corresponding model paths (X =
Reliability, M = trust, Y = Compliance, Reliance, Dependence Rate).
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Table 7
Indirect effects of trust for miss prone system reliability on compliance, reliance, and
dependence rate through subjective estimates of signaling system trust.

Source

Point
Estimate

SE

Bootstrapping 95% CI
Lower
Upper

Compliance

.043

.025

-.004

.092

Reliance

.037

.022

-.004

.084

Dependence Rate

.031

.018

-.004

.067

Note. Data bootstrapped (10,000).

Performance. For the MP systems, the performance factor of trust did not mediate the
relationships between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for either the
high or low risk groups.
Process. For the MP systems, the process factor of trust did not mediate the relationships
between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for either the high or low risk
groups.
Performance. For the MP systems, the performance factor of trust did not mediate the
relationships between reliability and compliance, reliance, nor dependence rate, for either the
high or low risk groups.
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Follow-up Serial Mediation Analyses. For the MP systems, serial mediation analyses
did not reveal any indirect effects of performance, process, nor purpose, on compliance rate or
reliance rate.
Summary of Results
Main Effects and Interactions.


Perceived Risk: Supporting the manipulation check, the high risk group indicated higher
perceived risk associated with poor task performance (supporting H9).



Trust: Higher reliability led to higher subjective trust (supporting H6).



Dependence Rate: Higher reliability led to a higher dependence rate. An interaction revealed
that this effect was more pronounced in the FP group.



Compliance: An interaction revealed that higher reliability led to a higher compliance rate,
but only for the FP group (supporting H7).



Reliance: An interaction revealed that a higher reliability led to a higher reliance rate, but
only in the MP group (supporting H8). Yet, although not statistically significant due to the
alpha correction, a higher false alarm rate led to a marginal reduction in reliance.



Primary task performance: Participants in the high risk group performed better on the
tracking task than those in the low risk group. No other significant effects on primary task
performance were observed.



Secondary task performance: Higher reliability led to higher sensitivity, yet an interaction
indicated that this effect was more pronounced in the MP group. Similarly, higher reliability
led to higher alarm scores, yet an interaction indicated this effect was more pronounced in the
MP group. Participants in the MP group responded slower than those in the FP group.
Moreover, participants responded quicker in the less reliable condition, but only for the FP
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group. Finally, there was a significant effect of reliability on response bias, but only in the FP
group. Specifically, participants in the higher reliable condition tended to respond as though
a tank was present more often.
FP systems: Moderated-mediation and mediation analyses. Although the single factor
of trust did not mediate any of the tested relationships, individual factors or bases of trust
differentially mediated the relationships between false alarm rate for both compliance and
reliance. The purpose factor of trust mediated the FP-compliance relationship (partially
supporting H1) and, although a weaker effect, the process factor of trust mediated the FPreliance relationship. Moreover, conditional indirect effects showed that those factors of trust
only mediated those relationships for participants in the high risk group (supporting H3,
according to Preacher et al., 2007). Yet, the index of moderated mediation was not significantly
different from zero, indicating those conditional indirect effects were not significantly different
from each other (failing to support H3, according to Hayes, 2015).
Follow-up serial mediation analyses gave a different perspective on the effect of false
alarm rate on compliance and reliance through performance, process, and then purpose.
Specifically, trust mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and compliance, by
affecting each factor in a sequential order. From this perspective H1 was supported, because the
effect of the FP system reliability on compliance was the result of each factor building off of
each other. Yet, a stronger mediating effect in the FP-compliance relationship was observed
through performance and then purpose. Additionally, the effect of false alarm rate on reliance
was mediated by the sequential effect of performance on process. Neither trust nor any of its
individual bases mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and general dependence rate
(failing to support H2).
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MP systems: Moderated-mediation and mediation analyses. Although factors of trust
mediated some of the FP-compliance/reliance relationships, none of those factors mediated any
of the MP-reliance (or dependence rate) relationships (supporting H4 and H5).
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DISCUSSION
Generally, the results supported the proposed hypotheses and observed differences did
not trade off with primary task performance (see Appendix I). Similar to other studies exploring
the compliance-reliance paradigm, predicted main effects and interactions were observed
(Chancey et al., 2015b; Dixon, 2001; Meyer, 2001, 2004; Rice, 2009). Yet, bases or factors of
trust indirectly affected response behaviors in the FP relationships, and not the MP relationships.
Moreover, trust only mediated those FP relationships for participants in the high risk group. For
the MP system, although trust was related to reliance (i.e., main effects of miss rate on trust and
reliance), the results indicated that the effect on trust was a byproduct of miss rate rather than a
causal mechanism affecting reliance behavior (cf. Bustamante, 2009).
Although there is somewhat compelling evidence to suggest that there are two different
cognitive processes underlying the FP-compliance and MP-reliance relationships, these
relationships lack theoretical and empirical specificity. The results from the current work suggest
that researchers may need to re-conceptualize the notion of two independent types of trust. The
following sections will first discuss how these results contribute theoretically to the compliancereliance paradigm, discuss the practical implications, and describe some limitations of the current
study and ideas for future research.
Theoretical Implications
The FP systems had a more direct effect on trust affecting behavior than the MP systems.
Although this indicates two independent psychological processes stemming from FP and MP
system reliability, the more plausible explanation is that trust more strongly affects behavior in
one relationship than the other (i.e., there are not two types of trust). Instead, other candidate
psychological constructs need to be explored to predict and explain the MP-reliance relationship,
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such as confidence and state-based suspicion (explored in Figure 21 below). Additionally, the
non-selective mediation stemming from false alarm rate on compliance and reliance suggests that
different combinations of the bases of trust, rather than two types of trust, likely affect these
behaviors. Figure 21 graphically represents the results obtained from the current study and
includes two candidate constructs to explain the MP-reliance relationship. The theoretical
contributions of this work will first be discussed from the effects of false alarm rate on
compliance and reliance, and then from the effects of miss rate on reliance.

Figure 21. Graphical depiction of study results (similar to model in Figure 2C). Note: Solid lines
represent significant effects, thin line represent weak effect, dashed lines represent hypothesized
mediational processes.

FP-compliance/reliance relationship: Non-selective effects of trust and the role of
risk. Although the initial compliance-reliance model proposed by Meyer (2001) was the
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suspected outcome (i.e., the model in Figure 2B), the results suggested that false alarm rate had a
non-selective effect on both compliance and reliance (i.e., more closely resembling the model in
Figure 2C). This outcome aligns well with the results of recent studies (e.g., Dixon et al. 2007;
Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Meyer et al., 2014; Rice & McCarley, 2011). Yet, the results of the
current study provide a more detailed account of the psychological processes of trust, according
to its bases, involved in determining the effect of FP system reliability on compliance and
reliance.
Contrary to earlier explanations, compliance and reliance are likely affected by two nonindependent forms of trust, stemming mainly from FP systems. The current study found that the
purpose basis of trust mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and compliance,
whereas the process basis of trust mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and
reliance. Yet, each of these mediating processes were the effect of the performance basis of trust.
Therefore, with FP systems, compliance and reliance are likely the manifestation of different
bases of trust acting upon each other (i.e., two manifestations of the same construct), rather than
two independent types of trust as suggested in the original compliance-reliance distinction (i.e.,
Meyer, 2001).
According to the serial mediation analyses, the performance factor of trust was affecting
the degree to which purpose was leading to compliance and process was leading to reliance. This
aligns well with the argument proposed earlier in the current work, where trust should develop
from the observation of automation behavior (i.e., performance; cf. Lee & See, 2004). Moreover,
the observation of automation performance should then provide evidence that tempers or
develops trust based on alternative levels of attributional abstraction (i.e., process, purpose). The
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faulty behavior associated with false alarms, as opposed to misses, in the current study, was
predicted to act causally through operator trust because of its salience.
For the FP-compliance relationship, the evaluation of the alarm systems’ performance led
to a significant effect on participants’ evaluation of the purpose of the automation. The results of
the current study indicate that if a system produces false alarms too often, the operator may
question the automation’s ability to achieve the goals it was designed to achieve. This effect
subsequently leads to non-compliant behavior when it does sound an alarm. In other words, false
alarms degrade the operator’s trust in why the automation was created in the first place. This
perspective endorses the idea that a system that warns an operator of everything ultimately
results in a system that warns the operator of nothing (i.e., the system has no apparent purpose;
cf. Lee & See, 2004).
Alternatively, for the FP-reliance relationship, evaluation of the alarm systems’
performance led to a significant effect on participants’ evaluation of the process of the
automation. If a system produces false alarms too often, when the system does remain silent after
consistently signaling target present events, this may contribute to a lack of understanding for
what caused the sudden silence. This sudden silence subsequently leads to non-reliant behavior
in the absence of an alarm. In other words, false alarms degrade the operator’s trust in the
apparent capability of how the automation is contributing to the achievement of the operator’s
goals (cf. Lee & See, 2004).
Risk of dependence. The results of the current study were somewhat conflicting, as to
whether risk moderated the mediating effect of trust on compliance and reliance. To test for
moderated mediation, Preacher et al., (2007) proposed the use of conditional indirect effects.
Using this approach, there was evidence to support the conclusion of moderated mediation in the
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current study, because factors of trust were mediating the relationship between false alarm rate
and compliance/reliance for only those in the high risk group. Alternatively, Hayes (2015)
proposed a more formal test of moderated mediation, by investigating if the path linking the
conditional indirect effect to the moderator is significantly different from zero (i.e., index of
moderated mediation). Based on this approach, the 95% confidence intervals for this path
contained zero (i.e., p > .05), indicating the two conditional indirect effects were not significantly
different from each other (i.e., the indirect effect of trust in the high risk group resembled the
same effect in the low risk group).
Regardless, risk is a critical factor in the majority of human-automation and interpersonal
theories of trust (however, see other models that omit risk, e.g., Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007;
Seong & Bisantz, 2000; Seong et al., 2006). Therefore, researchers wishing to draw causal links
between trust and behaviors should consider the role of risk, if their conclusions are to remain
consistent with a majority of theoretical perspectives of trust (e.g., measure risk, account for risk,
manipulate risk). This work is not the first to make this suggestion or attempt to impose an
element of risk upon participants (cf. Lyons, Stokes, Eschleman, Alacron, & Barelka, 2011).
Indeed, the impetus to use time investment penalties in the current study was adopted from the
work of Bliss et al. (1995; see also Bliss & Dunn, 2001). Because the sample participants in the
current study were college students, additional time investment was suspected to be personally
negative to participants. Although it is unclear how effectively the technique was implemented in
the current study, it did lead to conditionally significant indirect effects of trust according to risk
group assignment.
There are other ways in which risk may be manipulated in laboratory studies. Lyons et al.
(2011) manipulated risk perception in a simulated combat environment by having participants
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base their decisions on conflicting information that compromised the safety of a convoy.
Although this manipulation requires some imagination on the part of the participant, the sample
used by Lyons et al. (2011) was partially made up of military personnel who may have had to
make similar life-and-death decisions in the real world. Hanson, Bliss, Harden, and Papelis
(2014) used a similar technique to successfully manipulate task criticality, by telling participants
in that the cost of poor performance was the death of hypothetical team members. Bliss and
McAbee (1995) manipulated criticality in an alarm-response task by deducting more points for
the high criticality group as compared to the low criticality group.
Although the outcome from the current study is somewhat conflicting regarding risk, it
does indicate that risk was affecting the degree to which trust mediated the significant
relationships tested. Admittedly, the risk manipulation in the current study was minimally
effective, leaving room for improvement. Although students in the high-risk group may have
assigned higher risk ratings than those in the low risk group, there is a clear research opportunity
to explore individual differences that likely play a role here. Anecdotally, some individuals in the
high-risk group rated the consequences of poor performance as low, and alternatively some
individuals in the low risk group rated the consequences of poor performance as high. This
particular difference might be due to individual students’ differential need for achievement or
other underlying personality traits (Phillips & Gully, 1997). Future research should investigate
the moderating role of operator traits in similar paradigms (cf. Merritt & Ilgen, 2008).
Comparison with Chancey et al. (2015b). The current results aligned with those reported
by Chancey et al. (2015b). Interestingly, the main effects of reliability on trust and the interaction
of FP reliability on compliance had virtually identical effect sizes. Yet, there were some
noticeable differences in the degree to which subjective trust mediated the tested relationships.
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Specifically, in the current study trust as a single factor did not mediate the relationship between
reliability and compliance. Moreover, the associated mediating effect was noticeably smaller (κ2
=

.112) than the one reported by Chancey et al. (2015b; i.e., κ2 = .325). Even the significant

sequential indirect effects of the trust components on compliance (i.e., performance, process, and
purpose; Pm= .029; performance and purpose; Pm= .099) were still much smaller than the indirect
effect reported by Chancey et al. (2015b; Pm= .451).
The current results provide a unique opportunity to observe scientific research
replication. Specifically, not only were the experimental designs and analytical techniques
similar, so were many other aspects (e.g., same monitors, controls, headphones, primary tasks,
session durations, ODU students). Drawing comparisons between these studies may be valuable
in terms of directing future research endeavors and identifying variables that potentially
contribute to the degree to which subjective trust mediates particular relationships in alertedmonitor paradigms. Obviously, however, there are some differences that cannot be easily
accounted for, such as testing locations and potential differences in participants due to time and
seasonality differences.
Trust Questionnaire. The current study used a version of Madsen and Gregor’s (2000)
human-computer trust questionnaire, which was theoretically derived and modified to reflect Lee
and See’s (2004) bases of trust (i.e., performance, process, and purpose). Alternatively, Chancey
et al. (2015b) used Jian et al.’s (2001) empirically derived trust questionnaire. Clearly, the main
advantage of the questionnaire used in the current study is that it targets a specific theoretical
perspective of trust. As with the measurement of any construct, researchers should select a
measurement tool that reflects how the researcher conceptualizes the construct (see similar
argument by Salmon et al., 2009, on the measurement of situation awareness).
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It makes little sense to provide a theoretical argument for how trust should affect a
behavior given certain constraints, and subsequently measure trust in a way that is not congruent
with the theory backing the argument. In the current study, trust is characterized as an attitude,
which is an affective evaluation of beliefs. The informational bases of performance, process, and
purpose are beliefs about the automation, which are influenced by experience and information.
Therefore, it makes theoretical sense to measure trust by asking participants to subjectively
evaluate their beliefs about the system.
In the current study, trust mediated the FP-compliance/reliance relationships only when
the bases were ordered in a theoretically plausible way, rather than as a single factor of general
trust. Although this result supports the theoretical positions outlined in the current work, it may
also indicate important differences between each questionnaire. It is possible that the empirically
derived Jian et al. (2000) questionnaire measures more than just trust, as it is not aligned with
any particular theory of trust per se. This possibility, however, is not necessarily an altogether
undesirable trait. Indeed if the stronger mediating effect were due to the questionnaire, then this
provides researchers a starting point to discover what aspects of the questionnaire are leading to
this outcome. Additionally, this would indicate that researchers should be devoting more effort
into ascertaining what other constructs predict the FP-compliance/reliance relationships aside
from trust.
Transparency and workload. One of the clear differences between each study is that the
systems tested in the current study were more transparent than the entirely opaque systems tested
by Chancey et al. (2015b). Interestingly, however, a more transparent system should theoretically
lead to a stronger mediating effect of trust (cf. Chancey et al., 2015a). Specifically, with a
transparent system the operator has the ability to cross-validate system diagnoses with the
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underlying raw data, which allows for a more clear observation of automation behavior and error
characteristics (i.e., performance; Lee & See, 2004). Yet, on the topic of transparency, Adams et
al. (2003) argued that it might be more difficult for an operator to evaluate the quality of the
diagnostic output of a system that provides information (i.e., signaling system) rather than higher
stage automation that may provide a physical product. Adams et al., therefore, suggested that
differences in the ability to evaluate the quality of output could affect trust calibration in the long
run, which may account for the effect size differences observed between this study and Chancey
et al. (2015b).
Alternatively, because the system in the current study was transparent, this may have led
to differences in workload between each study. Specifically, participants in the current study
may have invested cognitive resources and visual attention to evaluate individual images in an
attempt to improve their performance. Conversely, with the opaque system used by Chancey et
al. (2015b), participants lacked the opportunity to crosscheck the system’s output to perform
better. Instead, participants had to rely on the stated reliability and feedback from the system,
potentially allowing for a workload difference between each study. Consequently, in the current
study, participants may have trusted (or distrusted) the system’s diagnoses but were too busy to
consistently evaluate the image and provide an informed decision to agree (or disagree) with the
system (cf. Rice, 2009; i.e., workload may have suppressed the mediating effect of trust). Further
research should investigate the mediating effect of workload and trust using a parallel multiple
mediator model, to evaluate which construct is better accounting for dependence behaviors.
Hayes (2013) advocates this method to test competing theories. Indeed, Wickens and McCarley’s
(2013) theoretical description of the compliance-reliance paradigm relies more heavily on
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performance constructs such as workload and divisions of attentional resources than trust as a
singular explanation.
Specificity of error characteristics disclosure. The current study supplied participants
very little information about the error characteristics before they interacted with each system.
Alternatively, Chancey et al. (2015b) provided participants with both the exact reliability level
and the error bias. Participants were also quizzed about those error characteristics before each
session, requiring all correct responses before allowing the session to begin. The differential
strength of the mediating effect of trust across both studies might be due in part to the difference
in error characteristic disclosure specificity. Lee and See (2004) propose that trust can develop
through analogical processes such as hearsay. Moreover, studies have shown that error disclosure
can have a significant impact on response behaviors (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Chancey & Bliss,
2010; Wang et al., 2009).
Clearly, error disclosure should add to a more complete mental model associated with the
alarm system, particularly if the participant has had limited interactions with the system to
observe error rates first hand. Further research should be conducted to assess if the mediating
effect of trust is moderated by the specificity of error disclosure. Results could have broad
practical applications, as disseminating the error characteristics of a particular alarm system via
intended (e.g., training) or unintended (e.g. hearsay) methods likely significantly impact trust and
subsequent response strategy of the operator (cf. Bliss et al., 1995).
Perceptual saliency of errors and performance feedback. There were clear differences
between the saliency of false alarms and misses in the current study: false alarms were
accompanied by both a visual cue and an auditory alert, whereas misses were accompanied by
neither cue. Yet, the alarm systems reported by Chancey et al. (2015b) were more similar in
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terms of error saliency: false alarms were accompanied by a red “Failure” and the fire bell of a
Boeing 747, whereas misses were accompanied by a green “OK” and a 1000 Hz tone. Moreover,
the performance feedback for a correct and incorrect decision was somewhat different between
the studies. In Chancey et al. (2015b), correct and incorrect decisions were accompanied by both
an on-screen point bank and a voice that announced “correct” and “incorrect” after each
decision. The current study provided more subtle performance feedback, offering only an onscreen point bank.
Although Chancey et al. (2015b) demonstrated that false alarm rate affected only
compliance and miss rate affected only reliance, the current study showed a non-selective effect
of false alarm rate on compliance and reliance and a selective effect of miss rate on reliance.
These results align with the saliency hypothesis and results reported by Dixon and Wickens
(2006), which were replicated by Dixon et al. (2007). Moreover, the current results found a nonselective mediating effect of trust on compliance and reliance for the FP system, whereas
Chancey et al. (2015b) found a selective mediating effect of trust on compliance for only the FP
system.
However, because both error saliency and performance feedback was different between
each study, it is difficult to parse out which (if either) effect was driving the mediating effect of
trust. Future researchers should consider manipulating error saliency and feedback
systematically. Clearly, outside of laboratory conditions these errors are usually different in
terms of both perceptual saliency and in the degree to which they offer the user a chance to learn
from their occurrence (see reliability defined by user perspective earlier in this document).
MP-reliance relationship: Confidence and state-based suspicion. Similar to Chancey
et al. (2015b), trust mediated the FP-compliance relationship but not the MP-reliance
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relationship, suggesting trust is not the operant variable in the MP relationship. Indeed, from a
theoretical perspective, there are plausible arguments to suggest that other constructs might be
better candidates. For example, recently the construct of state-based suspicion has been proposed
and may offer an alternative explanation to describe the MP-reliance relationship (Bobko,
Barelka, & Hirshfield, 2014). Importantly, one of the hypothesized components associated with
increased suspicion is missing information, which can lead to a reduction in performance indicies
due to the greater cognitive workload associated with searching for more information. This
scenario mirrors the results obtained by Dixon and Wickens (2006; Dixon et al., 2007), where
participants experienced an increase in workload when dividing attention among tasks to offset
the errors produced by the MP system. Moreover, the current study found that performance was
significantly worse for the MP system, which is plausibly the result of participants
unsuccessfully searching for additional information.
Another candidate construct that may be useful in describing the relationship between
misses and reliance is confidence (Chancey et al., 2015b). As suggested previously, one of the
differences between confidence and trust is that trust requires one choice in preference to
another, but confidence does not (Luhman, 1988). Systems that are MP do not offer salient
choices to deviate from the status quo. Differentiating between confidence and trust, Smith
(2005) proposed that confidence is living with everyday dangers, where a person can routinely
“bracket” life’s contingencies so that they can go about their business without continuous
uncertainty/anxiety (p. 307). Smith (2005) suggested that confidence is at play when people take
for granted expert knowledge and systems that control, predict, or keep contingent events from
happening (p. 307). This scenario could be easily used to describe the concept of complacency,
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where individuals assume that the “expert system” will work properly and engage in other
activities without worrying that the system will make an error that will go undetected.
Moreover, trust requires the acceptance and acknowledgement of risk, whereas
confidence does not (Luhman, 1988; Mayer et al., 1995). In the case of misses, if one does not
even recognize that he or she is at risk, then this is a state of confidence rather than trust. In the
current study, trust in MP systems did not significantly affect reliance even for those in the high
risk groups. Supporting this point, in a review of trust in automation, Adams et al. (2000) defined
a confident judgment as, “…a discrete reason-based judgment related to the probability of a
specific event that occurs outside the domain of risk, and is distinct from a trust judgment” (p.
30).
From the perspective that trust mediates the FP-compliance relationship, whereas
alternative constructs may mediate the MP-reliance relationship, Meyer’s (2001) initial proposal
of two types of trust may be accurate. Indeed, it may be more correct to conceptualize trust as
mediating one process and confidence or suspicion mediating the other. Yet, there is a current
dearth of available theoretically grounded measures to test for these alternative constructs
(however, see state-based suspicion questionnaire from Lyons et al., 2011).
One potential measure of signaling system confidence could be to simply have
participants rate the probability that a signaling system will make a false alarm, miss, correct
rejection, or hit. However, as argued throughout this work, one of the defining characteristics of
a miss is the absence of a cue. Therefore, asking operators or participants to evaluate the
occurrence of something they theoretically and plausibly should not be aware of may not be
successful. Alternatively, physiological measures associated with state-based suspicion have also
been proposed. Specifically, Bobko et al. (2014) suggested that state-based suspicion is
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associated with increased anterior cingulate cortex activity (ACC). Researchers, therefore, could
theoretically test for an increase in ACC for participants responding to a MP system. However,
such physiological activity could result from multiple factors.
Comparing FP and MP system task performance. The now increasingly common
finding of a non-selective effect of false alarm rate on both compliance and reliance, has led to a
general conclusion that false alarms negatively impact operator performance to a greater degree
than misses (Rice & McCarley, 2011). Interestingly, in this research FP systems affected
compliance and reliance more, but MP hindered secondary task performance more. When
compared to the FP group, participants in the MP group (particularly the 60% condition) took
longer to select tank present or absent and were worse at correctly indicating if a tank was
present or absent (i.e., alarm score), even independent of their response bias (i.e., d′).
The RT difference is likely due to the fact that the FP group had more auditory signals to
direct the attention of the participants away from the primary tasks. To illustrate, out of 60 total
aerial images, the FP 60% system had 54 auditory signals, the FP 90% system had 36 auditory
signals, the MP 90% system had 24 auditory signals, and the 60% MP system had just 6 auditory
signals. Supporting this idea, even within the FP group there was a significant effect of
reliability: more reliable systems led to longer RTs. This result is the opposite of what is
generally found in the existing literature (e.g., Chancey et al., 20015a; Getty et al., 1995;
Wickens & Dixon, 2008). Yet, there are multiple studies that have reported inconsistencies in the
relationship between reliability and RT for alerted-monitor systems (e.g., Bliss & Chancey,
2014; Rice, 2009; Wang et al., 2009). Because the signaling system was a secondary task,
participants plausibly did not consistently divert attentional resources away from the primary
task to support the secondary task. Instead, the auditory signal was likely heavily relied upon to
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support task switching. Additionally, RT was collected for only those responses that matched the
system’s diagnosis. This indicates that participants may have missed the picture entirely, and
simply agreed with the system when they finally did notice that their response was required.
From this perspective, the MP system may have been more akin to an opaque system, as
participants were not able to crosscheck the output by evaluating the image. This may also
partially explain why the FP group was better able to separate the tank present pictures from tank
absent pictures (i.e., the auditory signal afforded participants the ability to scan the picture for a
tank). If the MP system was less transparent than the FP system, then this may have also
contributed to the fact that trust did not mediate any of the MP-dependence relationships.
Interestingly, Wiegmann et al. (2001) proposed that subjective trust in a signaling system may
dissociate from the observed behavior when the operator lacks the information needed to inform
a diagnosis (see also Bliss, 2003, and Chancey et al. 2015a).
To this point, the only main effect of error bias on trust was observed for the performance
factor (i.e., the FP group indicated higher ratings than the MP group). As previously argued in
the current work, the performance basis of trust is the likely missing piece to provoke the
mediation of trust in the MP-reliance relationship. Moreover, the serial mediation analysis
indicated that the performance factor was significantly affecting other bases of trust, which led to
both compliant and reliant behaviors in the FP systems. Again, this perspective may also provide
marginal support for Rice and McCarley’s (2011) conclusion that false alarms are more
cognitively salient errors than misses, above perceptual saliency differences. Yet, there were
clear perceptual saliency differences between misses and false alarms in the current study.
Therefore, additional research is required to make a more definitive conclusion on the role of
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cognitive and perceptual error saliency differences on the mediating effect of trust in the
compliance-reliance paradigm.
An additional reason the FP group outperformed the MP group may also be due to the
fact that the visual cue helped participants more efficiently search images. If the system made an
error it was either a false alarm or a miss, it never signaled the wrong quadrant to search (i.e., if
the system highlighted a quadrant, it was either in that area or not in the image at all). This gave
participants using FP systems a distinct performance advantage over those using the MP system.
Yet, for the MP system these results makes ecological sense. The essence of a MP system is that
it is automation that generally leaves a majority of the monitoring task to the human. If the
human monitors poorly, then this will be reflected in many missed events. Second, response time
requires that there is something to respond to (i.e., an alarm, alert, or advisory). With an MP
system, unless the operator notices non-signal related cues (e.g., smoke from a fire, patient
calling for help, engine backfiring), they would not be expected to respond quickly or at all to
potential problems.
Practical Applications
Although the tasks in the current study were described as simulating pilot responsibilities
during flight, the experimental paradigm used in the current study approximated a complex task
environment that was relatively abstract from actual pilot responsibilities (cf. experiment 1 from
Wickens et al., in press). Indeed, others have used similar tasks and paradigms to study and
comment on a variety of multi-tasking domains in which an operator must engage with an
unreliable reliable signaling system (cf. Bliss & Dunn, 2000; Bustamante, 2009; Dixon &
Wickens, 2006). The results from this study, therefore, are not necessarily restricted to aviation
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applications alone. The remainder of this section discusses how several domains can benefit from
the current work and concludes with some general implications.
Hospital physiological-based alarm systems. The current work did not find that trust
mediated the relationship between reliability and responses for the MP systems (cf. Chancey et
al., 2015b). This finding is particularly relevant to physiological-based alarming thresholds (e.g.,
pulse-oximetry), in which some hospitals have altered criterions to be more conservative (i.e.,
MP) to combat excessive false alarms leading to clinical alarm-fatigue (Whalen et al., 2015;
Chancey et al., 2015b). Practitioners investigating and implementing threshold changes may
want to consider that those adjustments will not only differentially impact response behaviors,
but also system evaluations that may not be related to system trust. Instead, practitioners may
want to consult other theoretical frameworks, such as state-based suspicion or confidence. These
constructs may provide greater insight into predicting operator behavior or determining why the
behavior occurred.
Additionally, with pulse-oximetry based monitoring systems some healthcare
practitioners may not understand the technological limitations of the system, which arise from
calibration assumptions, optical interferences, and signal artifacts leading to false alarms (Sinex,
1999; e.g., blue or black nail polish may interfere with accurate readings). Training healthcare
workers to understand the underlying process of these systems, in addition to the medical aspects
associated with the patient, may help buffer the deterioration of trust associated with the
observable performance based errors of trust that are likely salient due to the frequent false
alarms. Yet, it should be noted, in the case of multitasking and overload, workers may trust the
system and intend to comply but be too busy (cf. Rice, 2009).
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Automotive collision warning systems. Collision warning systems have emerged as an
application of signaling system technology intended to lessen vehicle crashes. Yet, as with other
sensor-based signaling systems, these systems can produce errors (Lees & Lee, 2007; Scott &
Gray, 2008). The error bias of these systems depend upon driving style, where drivers with
shorter headways experience more misses and drivers with longer headways experience more
false alarms (Lees, 2010, p. 38; Ben-Yaacov, Maltz, & Shinar, 2002 Maltz & Shinar, 2004).
Moreover, research has shown that automotive collision warning system errors (misses and false
alarms) differentially impact driver responses and trust (Abe & Richardson, 2006; Bliss &
Acton, 2003; Shah, Bliss, Chancey, & Brill, 2015). Yet, in the context of the results from the
current study, trust may be more impactful on affecting response behaviors for drivers who adopt
longer headways, and experience more false alarms, than those who adopt shorter headways, and
experience more misses. If this were the case, sensor thresholds could be tailored to individual
driving styles, as false alarms would more negatively impact system compliance and also
reliance to a lesser degree (see Lees & Lee, 2007, and Lees, 2010, who discuss collision
avoidance alarm errors on trust according to performance, process, and purpose).
Process control and complacency. Process control is often studied in relation to
operator complacency (Bahner, Elepfandt, & Manzey, 2008; Bahner, Hüper, & Manzey, 2008;
Moray & Inagaki, 1999). Earlier in this work misses were said to be associated with
complacency. Yet, it should be noted that complacency is not often investigated in process
control where the monitor is aided by a signaling system. Instead, the operator is generally in
charge of monitoring automated processes and asked to intervene when a fault occurs. The same
type of sampling strategy, however, would likely occur even with the presence of a signaling
system. Again, humans are not generally well suited to notice the absence of events and objects
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(Hearst, 1991). Therefore, the role of trust in these paradigms deserves some discussion, as the
notion of “over-trust” is frequently invoked when describing complacency in process control
tasks.
As argued throughout this work, and empirically demonstrated across this and one other
study (i.e., Chancey et al., 2015b), misses are less impactful on affecting behavior through
(subjective) trust. Indeed, in a review of complacency and automation bias, Parasuraman and
Manzey (2010) acknowledge the lack of convincing empirical links between poor automation
monitoring and “high trust” (cf. Lee & See, 2004). Instead, Parasuraman and Manzey cite the
work of Baily and Scerbo (2007) as “the only, somewhat tentative, evidence” for a link between
trust and monitoring behaviors (p. 389). Parasuraman and Manzey suggest that the weak
empirical demonstration within the literature is likely due to a discrepancy between subjective
and objective measures of trust. The author would agree with this conclusion, as it is difficult to
ask participants to evaluate something they should not have conscious access to (i.e., a missed
event). In disagreement with Parasuraman and Manzey’s conclusion, the answer to linking
complacency with trust should not be to operationalize trust as a behavior. Results from the
current study indicate that researchers studying process control and complacency may want to
consider the role of confidence and suspicion in determining monitoring behaviors, rather than
trust.
General implications. The error biases of signaling systems are determined by sensor
threshold settings, which can be set to any level desired (Sorkin & Woods, 1985). System
designers must determine which error is more critical to the task (Rice, 2009). As demonstrated
in this work, not only will error bias differentially affect operator responses, it also affects
subjective evaluations of the signaling system (cf. Chancey et al., 2015b). The results of the
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current work could be used to determine threshold settings and predict the effects of those
settings on the operator.
Additionally, from a practical perspective, it is unclear how enlightening the conclusion
that “the operator did not comply with the alarm because of a lack of trust,” really is. In the
context of Lee and See’s (2004) theoretical perspective, if the components of trust are targeted
according to system error bias (i.e., MP, FP), then the practitioner can give more targeted
recommendations to support the specific individual goal-oriented informational bases that are
lacking. In line with this reasoning, the current work goes beyond the simple idea that “trust”
mediates the relationship between error characteristics and reaction behaviors, and proposes the
use of testable theoretically grounded mechanisms that can inform the design and training
programs associated with signaling systems.
Limitations and Future Research
Although the current work offers an alternative perspective from which to conceptualize
and study the compliance-reliance paradigm, it is not without limitations. It is admittedly
difficult to replicate real world risk in the laboratory. Also, the college students tested may not
have had adequate experience interacting with alarm systems to provide an accurate depiction for
how trust affects response behaviors in real world situations.
The questionnaire used in the current study is also not without issue. Although Adams et
al. (2001) appreciated the theoretical nature of the questionnaire developed by Madsen and
Gregor (2000); the authors did take some issue with the analytical technique used to derive the
factors. Adams et al. (2001) suggested a confirmatory factor analysis should have been used to
make a fair assessment of the hypothesized factors. The recommendations of the current work
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are not only to further psychometrically vet this questionnaire, but also implement its use in more
studies.
Finally, although the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate simple
mediation models is relatively accepted, some researchers suggest that structural equation
modeling (SEM) programs (e.g., LISREL, AMOS, or Mplus) are required for more complex
modeling such as the ones described in the current work (e.g., Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng,
2007). Yet, Preacher (2013) suggests that there are no consequential differences between the
results obtained by OLS regression and SEM programs. Instead, Preacher suggests that
differences observed between these techniques are due to algorithmic differences, programspecific defaults, and decimal rounding differences (to name a few), rather than data-specific
differences (p. 160). Preacher also suggests that SEM programs may be more likely to slightly
err in small samples and that the OLS regression procedure is more appropriate (for discussion
on this topic see Preacher, 2013, p. 159-162).
The analytical techniques used in the current study are relatively new, and offer
behavioral scientists a way to analyze data that was previously largely prohibitive, due to the
constraints of small samples (e.g., experimental research often requires testing participants
individually in experimental sessions that may take an hour or more). Clearly, ANOVA is an
extremely effective tool for discovering how variables affect each other. Yet investigating
mediation, moderation, and conditional processes provides an alternative view of empirical data
that can be used to describe how variables affect each other according to a specific theory (or
competing theory). Describing the current data through process analyses allowed for very
specific theoretical aspects to be tested (i.e., the conditional effects of error characteristics
through trust on outcome behaviors with and without risk). If only main effects and interactions
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were interpreted, the explanations offered in this work would have been very similar to previous
conclusions and added very little to the understanding of the compliance-reliance paradigm.
Therefore, researchers should take advantage of these emerging techniques to complement
existing analytical methods, which could result in a better understanding of established effects
and outcomes.
Conclusion
The predominant explanation linking the error characteristics of signaling systems and
dependence behaviors is based on the presupposition that two independent forms of trust mediate
the FP-compliance and MP-reliance relationships. Yet, the results of the current work suggest
that trust mediates the FP-compliance and FP-reliance relationships and not the MP-reliance
relationship, leading to the conclusion that there are not two independent types of trust. By
linking the compliance-reliance paradigm to a specific theory of trust in automation and a
theoretically congruent questionnaire, researchers can more effectively and systematically
investigate this alerted-monitor paradigm.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision whether to say YES
or NO to participation in this research, and to record the consent of those who say YES.
TITLE OF RESEARCH: User Performance with Flight Simulation Tasks
RESEARCHERS:
James P. Bliss, Ph.D., Professor, Responsible Project Investigator, College of Sciences, Psychology
Department
Eric T. Chancey, M.S., Graduate Student, College of Sciences, Psychology Department.
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY:
Ninety participants will be tested in this experiment. Those who agree to be tested will complete a
background information form. Following this, you will be asked to perform a familiarization session with
multiple tasks that simulate tasks similar to those that aircraft pilots perform. After training, you will be
asked to perform the simulated aircraft tasks in several experimental sessions. To simulate maintaining
stable flight, you will use a joystick to complete a tracking task. You will also monitor and manage
depleting fuel of the aircraft by pressing keys on a keyboard. Finally, you will view aerial images that will
occasionally have tanks imbedded in them. You will be asked to decide if a tank is in the image or if it is
not, with the help of a “tank spotting aid.” After the experimental sessions, you will complete an opinion
questionnaire to indicate your strategy for responding. You will then be debriefed and dismissed. The
entire experiment should almost 2 hours.
You will receive 2 SONA credits for participating in this study.
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA:
To participate, you must be over the age of 18. You must have normal vision or corrected-to-normal
vision. You must also have normal or corrected-to-normal hearing. Therefore, if you normally wear
eyeglasses, contact lenses or hearing aids you will need to wear them to participate.
RISKS AND BENEFITS:
RISKS: If you decide to participate in this study, then you may face a risk of eyestrain similar to the
eyestrain experienced during normal computer usage. The researcher tried to reduce these risks by
limiting the experimental participation time to less than two hours. And, as with any research, there is
some possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been identified.
BENEFITS: There are no direct benefits for participation in this study. However, you may learn valuable
information about how research is conducted.
COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
The researchers want your decision about participating in this study to be absolutely voluntary. The main
benefit to you for participating in this study is the extra credit or course credit points that you will earn for
your class. Although they are unable to give you payment for participating in this study, if you decide to
participate in this study, you will receive 1 Psychology Department research credit, which may be applied
to course requirements or extra credit in certain Psychology courses. Equivalent credits may be obtained
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in other ways. You do not have to participate in this study, or any Psychology Department study, to obtain
this credit.
CONFIDENTIALITY:
Your participation is completely confidential. The researcher will remove all identifiers from the
information. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications; but the
researcher will not identify you individually in such publications.
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE:
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away or
withdraw from the study -- at any time. Your decision will neither affect your relationship with Old
Dominion University, nor cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. The
researchers reserve the right to withdraw your participation in this study, at any time, if they observe
potential problems with your continued participation.
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY:
If you agree to participate, then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights.
However, in the event of harm, injury, or illness arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University
nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other
compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any
research project, you may contact Dr. James P. Bliss at 757-683-4051, Dr. George Maihafer (IRB Chair)
at 757-683-4520, or the ODU Office of Research, 757-683-3460.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT:
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have
had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research study, and its risks and
benefits. The researchers should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If
you have any questions later on, please contact the researcher at the number above.
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or this form,
then you should call Dr. George Maihafer (IRB Chair) from the Old Dominion University Office of
Research, 757-683-4520, or the ODU Office of Research, 757-683-3460.
By signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to participate in this study. The
researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records.

-----------------------------------Participant’s Name

------------------------------------- -----------------------Participant’s Signature
Date

-----------------------------------Investigator’s Name

------------------------------------- -----------------------Investigator’s Signature
Date
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APPENDIX B
TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE
Structure of trust questionnaire:
Performance (Predictability; Ability): What does the automation do? (Trust is in the actions of the agent)
• The tank spotting aid always provides the advice I require to help me perform well.
• The tank spotting aid’s advice reliably helps me perform well.
• The tank spotting aid’s advice consistently helps me perform well.
• For me to perform well, I can rely on the tank spotting aid to function properly.
• The tank spotting aid adequately analyzes the pictures consistently, to help me perform well.
Process (Dependability; Integrity): How does the automation work? (Trust is in the agent, not the actions)
 Although I may not know exactly how the tank spotting aid works, I know how to use it to perform well.
 I will be able to perform well the next time I use the tank spotting aid because I understand how it behaves.
 I understand how the tank spotting aid will help me perform well.
 It is easy to follow what the tank spotting aid does to help me perform well.
 To help me perform well, I recognize what I should do to get the advice I need from the tank spotting aid
the next time I use it.
Purpose (Faith; Benevolence): Why was the automation developed? (Trust is in the agent, irrespective of past
behaviors)
 To help me perform well, I believe advice from the tank spotting aid even when I don’t know for certain
that it is correct.
 To help me perform well, when I am uncertain about deciding “Tank Present” or “Tank Absent” I believe
the tank spotting aid rather than myself.
 If I am not sure about whether to click “Tank Present” or “Tank Absent,” I have faith that the tank spotting
aid will provide the correct solution to help me perform well.
 Even when the tank spotting aid gives me unusual advice, I am certain that the aid’s advice will help me to
perform well.
 Even if I have no reason to expect that the tank spotting aid will function properly, I still feel certain that it
will help me to perform well.
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TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE

Part. #: _______ Group: ________ Session: ________ Date:______ Time:_______
Below is a list of statements for evaluating trust between people and automated systems.
Please circle the number that best describes your feeling or your impression of the tank
spotting aid you used during the task.
1.
Even when the tank spotting aid gives me unusual advice, I am certain that
aid’s advice will help me to perform well.
Not descriptive: 1
2.

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

I understand how the tank spotting aid will help me perform well.

Not descriptive: 1
8.

7

The tank spotting aid’s advice consistently helps me perform well.

Not descriptive: 1
7.

6

The tank spotting aid’s advice reliably helps me perform well.

Not descriptive: 1
6.

5

It is easy to follow what the tank spotting aid does to help me perform well.

Not descriptive: 1
5.

4

To help me perform well, when I am uncertain about deciding “Tank Present”
or “Tank Absent” I believe the tank spotting aid rather than myself.

Not descriptive: 1
4.

3

For me to perform well, I can rely on the tank spotting aid to function properly.

Not descriptive: 1
3.

2

the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

Even if I have no reason to expect that the tank spotting aid will function
properly, I still feel certain that it will help me to perform well.

Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive
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9.
Although I may not know exactly how the tank spotting aid works, I know
use it to perform well.
Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

10.
To help me perform well, I believe advice from the tank spotting aid even
don’t know for certain that it is correct.
Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

when I

12 : Very Descriptive

11.
To help me perform well, I recognize what I should do to get the advice I
from the tank spotting aid the next time I use it.
Not descriptive: 1

how to

need

12 : Very Descriptive

12.
I will be able to perform well the next time I use the tank spotting aid because I
understand how it behaves.
Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

13.
If I am not sure about whether to click “Tank Present” or “Tank Absent,” I
have
faith that the tank spotting aid will provide the correct solution to help
me perform
well.
Not descriptive: 1
14.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

The tank spotting aid always provides the advice I require to help me perform well.

Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

15.
The tank spotting aid adequately analyzes the pictures consistently, to help
perform well.
Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

me
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APPENDIX C
PERCEIVED RISK QUESTIONNAIRE
Part. #: _______ Group: ________ Session: ________ Date:______ Time:_______
The following questions are about how you perceive the level of risk associated with
maintaining a high level of performance during the experiment.
I believe that…
1.

The consequences for performing poorly on these tasks are substantial.

Not descriptive: 1
2.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

The overall risk of performing poorly on these tasks is high.

Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

3.
Overall I would label the consequences of performing poorly on these tasks as
something negative.
Not descriptive: 1
4.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

I would label the consequences of performing poorly on these tasks as a
significant loss.

Not descriptive: 1
5.

2

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 : Very Descriptive

Performing poorly on the experimental tasks could have negative

Not descriptive: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

ramifications.

12 : Very Descriptive
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APPENDIX D
SONA RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENT
User Performance with Flight Simulation Tasks
James P. Bliss and Eric T. Chancey, of the ODU Psychology Department are currently conducting an experiment.
Brief research overview: The purpose of this research is to investigate how operators react to various flight
simulation tasks.
Research overview
Ninety participants will be tested in this experiment. Those who agree to be tested will complete a
background information form. Following this, you will be asked to perform a familiarization session with multiple
tasks that simulate tasks similar to those that aircraft pilots perform. After training, you will be asked to perform the
simulated aircraft tasks several experimental sessions. To simulate maintaining stable flight, you will use a joystick
to complete a tracking task. You will also monitor and manage depleting fuel of the aircraft by pressing keys on a
keyboard. Finally, you will view aerial images that will occasionally have tanks imbedded in them. You will be
asked to decide if a tank is in the image or if it is not, with the help of a “tank spotting aid.” After the experimental
sessions, you will complete an opinion questionnaire to indicate your strategy for responding. You will then be
debriefed and dismissed. The entire experiment should last almost 2 hours.
You will receive 2 SONA credits for participating in this study.

131

APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTION SHEET
Welcome to project PROCESS, please put away your cell phone and turn it on silent.
HIGH RISK: The following experiment should take almost 2 hours, at the end of which you will receive 2 SONA
credits. Though, participants that perform well on these tasks generally take much less time (about 1 hour or
less). However, because some students have not been trying very hard in these sessions we are enforcing some
consequences for students who do not, or choose not to, maintain a high level of performance for all of the tasks
during the experimental sessions. Performing poorly on the experimental tasks will result in having to spend
extra time beyond the 2-hour session until your performance reaches an adequately high level (up to 30 minutes
longer). Even if you do go over time, you will still only receive 2 SONA credits for participating today. Again, if
you don’t perform well on these tasks you will have to stay longer and you won’t get additional SONA credit. If
you do perform well you will get out much earlier.
LOW RISK: The following experiment should take almost 2 hours, at the end of which you will receive 2 SONA
credits.
You will be asked to take part in several flight simulation tasks. The tasks you will be expected to respond to will be
the tracking task, resource management task, and the tank spotting task. These tasks must be completed the entire
time. Your performance will be recorded and monitored by the experimenter during each session.
Do you have any questions so far?
Tracking Task
For the tracking task your job is to keep the target in the center of the rectangular box. The overall purpose
of this task is to keep the aircraft (represented by the blue circle) within the dotted rectangular area in the center of
this task. Try to maintain this at all times. You control the aircraft with movements of the joystick. If you do not
control the aircraft with the joystick, it will drift away from the center. If the aircraft leaves the rectangular area try
to bring the aircraft back to center as quickly as possible.

Resource Management task
The lower right region of the main window contains the resource management task. The rectangular
regions identified with the letters A-F represent fuel tanks. The green levels within the tanks represent fuel levels.
Along the lines, which connect the tanks, are pumps that transfer fuel from one tank to another in the direction
indicated by the arrows.
There are 8 pumps labeled with the numbers 1-8. A rectangular box represents each one of the pumps with
a number inside it that identifies the pump, and an arrow that indicates the direction of the fuel. The pumps are used
to transfer fuel from the supply tanks to the main tanks.
Deactivated pumps are colored in gray

, activated pumps are green

, and failed pumps are
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red
failed.

. Note in the figure that pumps 1, 2, 4, and 6 are active, pumps 3, 7, and 8 are inactive, and pump 5 is

When a pump activates, the numbers change in the “Pump Status” area. Under “Pump Status,” two
columns of numbers are present. In the first column, numbers 1 through 8, correspond directly to the pumps in the
diagram. The second column indicates the flow rate in units per minute for each pump when it is on.
In the figure below, the numbers underneath tanks A and B and to the right on tanks C and D represent the
amount of fuel for each of those tanks. Those numbers will be increasing and decreasing as the fuel levels change.
The capacity for the main tanks, A and B, is 4000 units each. The supply tanks, C and D, contain a maximum of
2000 units each. Tanks E and F are supply tanks that have an unlimited capacity – they never run out. The areas
shaded in light blue on the side of tanks A and B indicate the critical levels of fuel for those tanks. You must transfer
fuel to tanks A and B to meet these criteria because the fuel tanks A and B are always being consumed.

When the resource management task begins, the fuel level for Tanks A and B is at 2500 units. You are to
keep the level of fuel from dropping below or above this level as indicated by the marker on either side of these
pumps. As time passes, tanks A and B lose fuel. These tanks would eventually become empty without the transfer of
additional fuel. Tanks C and D only lose fuel if they are transferring fuel to another tank.
Let’s consider the process of transferring fuel. Each pump can only transfer fuel in the direction indicated
by the ^ arrow in its label. Pressing the number key corresponding to the pump activates the pumps. A pump is
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actively transferring fuel when it turns green.
So far, you’ve seen two conditions for the pumps: ON and OFF. If you press the pump number on the
keyboard just once, you will turn the pump ON
; pressing the key again turns that pump OFF
, and
so on. If a tank fills up to its capacity, all incoming pump lines will be turned off automatically. This is because a
full tank cannot receive any more fuel. You will have to turn those pumps back on at a later time, if the fuel level of
the tank goes below the critical level. Furthermore, if a tank becomes empty, all outgoing pumps will automatically
be turned off. This is because an empty tank can no longer transfer fuel. In that case, the proper action is to supply
fuel to an empty tank before turning a pump that transfers fuel out of it.
At some point during the execution of the resource management task, one or more of the pumps may fail.
When a pump fails, its label turns red. Depending on the level of fuel in the tank affected, you might need to transfer
fuel from one main tank to another main tank to compensate for the loss of fuel. You can cross feed fuel from one
main tank to the other by activating either pump 7 or 8 (see the figure below)

Once again, the overall goal is to maintain the fuel level in tanks A and B as close to 2500 units each for as
long as you possibly can. There may be more than one way to achieve this goal; you may use the method that works
best for you. If the fuel level in these tanks should deviate from this level, please return the fuel level back this this
point as soon as possible.
Tank-spotting Task

Finally, you will be asked to search aerial images of a combat zone for the presence of
enemy tanks. If you think a tank is present you simply click the button labeled “Tank Found!” at
the bottom of the image. If you don’t think there is a tank in the image you simply click the
button labeled “No Tank.” The picture below shows you what this task will look like.
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The picture below shows you what the five potential tanks will look like that will
occasionally be imbedded within the aerial images.

The picture below shows you what an imbedded tank looks like in the aerial image. The
tank has been circled to show you where it is.
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To help you accomplish this task, you can use the tank spotting aid that will notify you when it thinks there
is a tank present. If the tank spotting aid thinks a tank is present it will circle one of the four quadrants and sound an
alarm. In the image below, the tank spotting aid has correctly sounded the alarm for a tank.

In the image below, the tank spotting aid has correctly remained silent because there is no tank in the picture.
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You will be working with three different tank spotting aids today. Importantly, some of these
aids will be unreliable and may make some errors. I will give you a general idea about the
reliability of each aid before you use it. You will be asked to interact with these aids in the most
efficient strategy you deem possible.
To help you track your performance, there is a point bank at the bottom of the screen. You will
start out with 20 points. You should try to accumulate as many points as possible.
Every time you click “Tank Found!” when there is a tank in the picture, you will receive 1 point.
Every time you click “No Tank” when there is no tank in the picture, you will receive 1 point.
Every time you click “Tank Found!” when there is NO tank in the picture, you will loose 1 point.
Every time you click “No Tank” when there is a tank in the picture, you will loose 1 point.
For researcher only:
Experimental session:
Now that you have had a chance to practice these tasks do you have any questions?
Before we begin, I have a questionnaire for you to fill out (give perceived risk questionnaire).
Ok, now you will start the first of three experimental sessions. Halfway through each session I
will pause the simulation and ask you to fill out a questionnaire. After each session you will have
a chance to take a break if you wish.
100%:
If you are ready to begin the first experimental session we will start now (start session).
90%:
For this experimental session, we know from past performance history that the tank spotting aid
tends to be pretty reliable, so it probably will not make a lot of mistakes. You should use this
information to help you complete the tank finding task. Do you have any questions about the
experiment so far? (start session)
60%:
For this experimental session, we know from past performance history that the tank spotting aid
tends to be pretty tends to be pretty unreliable, so it probably will make a lot of mistakes. You
should use this information to help you complete the tank finding task. Do you have any
questions about the experiment so far? (start session)
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APPENDIX F
DEMOGRAPHIC FORM
Participant #_____ Date:__________ Time:__________
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect background information for participants in this experiment. This
information will be used strictly for this experiment and for research purposes only. Please complete or circle each
item to the best of your knowledge.
1. Age _________
2.

Male
Female

3. Have you ever been diagnosed as color blind or color deficient? ________
0 = No
1 = Yes
4. Have you ever been diagnosed as having hearing loss?________
0 = No
1 = Yes
5. If yes, do you have correction with you (i.e. hearing aid)?_______
0=No
1=Yes
6. Have you ever been diagnosed as being nearsighted (myopic)? _______
0=No
1=Yes
7. Have you ever been diagnosed as being farsighted (hyperopic)?_______
0=No
1=Yes
8. If you answered yes to either #6 or #7, do you have correction with you (i.e. glasses, contact lenses, etc.)?
_______
0=No
1=Yes
9. How many hours per week do you play video/simulation games? _______

10. How many hours per week do you use a computer (work and recreation combined)?______
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APPENDIX G
PICTURE OF EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
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APPENDIX H
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Reliance
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.9432
0.8788
0.911
0.947
0.8864
0.9167
0.9451
0.8826
0.9138
0.863
0.6919
0.7775
0.9085
0.6566
0.7825
0.8858
0.6742
0.78

Std. Deviation
0.11323
0.14511
0.13269
0.1137
0.08482
0.10376
0.11215
0.11753
0.11845
0.2461
0.08273
0.20103
0.1855
0.12373
0.20129
0.21659
0.10554
0.20001

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88

Compliance
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.846
0.928
0.887
0.7955
0.9432
0.8693
0.8207
0.9356
0.8782
0.5253
0.9242
0.7247
0.5253
0.9394
0.7323
0.5253
0.9318
0.7285

Std. Deviation
0.0821
0.09724
0.09814
0.08972
0.06499
0.1076
0.08875
0.08209
0.10277
0.06823
0.14298
0.23018
0.11858
0.16703
0.25371
0.09561
0.15384
0.24086

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
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Dependence
Rate
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.8848
0.8985
0.8917
0.8561
0.9091
0.8826
0.8705
0.9038
0.8871
0.5576
0.7152
0.6364
0.5621
0.6848
0.6235
0.5598
0.7
0.6299

Std. Deviation
0.06956
0.10714
0.08954
0.07793
0.05651
0.07242
0.07444
0.08482
0.08109
0.0676
0.07107
0.10512
0.12184
0.11671
0.13325
0.0974
0.09672
0.1195

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.7745
0.7008
0.7376
0.7043
0.7157
0.71
0.7394
0.7082
0.7238
0.5235
0.4338
0.4787
0.478
0.4237
0.4509
0.5008
0.4288
0.4648

Std. Deviation
0.12936
0.17863
0.15858
0.1731
0.13684
0.15431
0.15513
0.15743
0.15618
0.15545
0.16697
0.16575
0.20704
0.15081
0.18109
0.18238
0.15731
0.17315

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88

Trust
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total
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Performance
(Trust)
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.7598
0.6629
0.7114
0.6727
0.7038
0.6883
0.7163
0.6833
0.6998
0.4523
0.353
0.4027
0.4348
0.3432
0.389
0.4436
0.3481
0.3958

Std. Deviation
0.14735
0.22008
0.19148
0.20129
0.1452
0.17416
0.17981
0.18542
0.18234
0.19199
0.17785
0.18965
0.19986
0.1718
0.18993
0.19387
0.17288
0.18882

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.8136
0.7576
0.7856
0.7644
0.7674
0.7659
0.789
0.7625
0.7758
0.6553
0.553
0.6042
0.5697
0.5492
0.5595
0.6125
0.5511
0.5818

Std. Deviation
0.1197
0.1668
0.14625
0.19088
0.16064
0.17436
0.15941
0.16191
0.1603
0.16301
0.19359
0.18427
0.25936
0.19186
0.22569
0.21841
0.19048
0.20606

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88

Process
(Trust)
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total
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Purpose
(Trust)
90% Reliability

Risk
High Risk

Low Risk

Total

60% Reliability

High Risk

Low Risk

Total

Error
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total
False Alarm Prone
Miss Prone
Total

Mean
0.75
0.6818
0.7159
0.6758
0.6758
0.6758
0.7129
0.6788
0.6958
0.4629
0.3955
0.4292
0.4295
0.3788
0.4042
0.4462
0.3871
0.4167

Std. Deviation
0.15171
0.18637
0.17144
0.18226
0.16181
0.17033
0.16992
0.17251
0.1711
0.16973
0.16944
0.17103
0.20548
0.16684
0.18674
0.18701
0.16639
0.17847

N
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
22
22
44
22
22
44
44
44
88
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
Hypotheses

Results

1.) Trust will mediate the
relationship between signaling
system reliability and
compliance for FP systems.

Partially Supported: A significant conditional indirect effect
indicated that the purpose factor of trust mediated the relationship
between reliability and compliance for the FP system.
Supported: Serial mediation analyses revealed that the indirect
effect of performance, process, and then purpose, significantly
indirectly affected compliance rate through all three of the bases
of trust sequentially.
Not Supported: Neither trust nor any of its individual bases
mediated the relationship between false alarm rate and general
dependence rate.

2.) Trust will mediate the
relationship between reliability
and dependence rate for the FP
signaling systems.
3.) Risk will moderate the
mediating effect of trust in the
tested relationships.

Supported: The purpose factor of trust mediated the FPcompliance relationship and the process factor mediated the FPreliance relationship. Conditional indirect effects showed that
those factors of trust only mediated those relationships for
participants in the high risk group.
Not Supported: The index of moderated mediation for both
analyses were not significantly different from zero, indicating
those conditional indirect effects were not significantly different
from each other.

4.) Trust will not mediate the
relationship between reliability
and reliance for MP systems.

Supported: Neither trust nor any of its individual factors
mediated the relationship between reliability and reliance for the
MP systems.

5.) Trust will not mediate the
relationship between reliability
and dependence rate for the MP
signaling systems.

Supported: Neither trust nor any of its individual factors
mediated the relationship between reliability and dependence rate
for the MP systems.

6.) Higher reliability will lead to
higher subjective ratings of trust

Supported: A main effect indicated participants in the higher
reliability group assigned higher ratings of trust.

7.) An interaction will occur,
where the FP system will more
directly impact compliance.

Supported: An interaction revealed that higher reliability led to a
higher compliance rate, but only for the FP group.

8.) An interaction will occur,
where the MP system will more
directly impact reliance.

Supported: An interaction revealed that a higher reliability led to
a higher reliance rate, but only in the MP group.

9.) Participants in the high-risk
group will report higher
perceived risk ratings than those
in the low-risk group.

Supported: A main effect indicated that the high risk group
assigned higher perceived risk ratings associated with poor task
performance.
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